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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Appellate Court No. 20000271
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Civil No. 990908206

v.
MICHAEL J. KEARNS,

Priority No. 15
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court pursuant to its original

appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann., § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Utah Court
of Appeals for disposition.
2.

This appeal is from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court for the

State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Sandra Peuler presiding, denying Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellee believes that Appellant's statement of issues on appeal are not
correctly stated as Appellee believes that Appellant has incorrectly stated the
standard of review. In addition, Appellant's failure to correctly state the standard of
review has caused it to omit an issue of necessary consideration for this Court.
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Consequently, Appellee will restate the issues according to the appropriate
standards of review.
1.

Was the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed timely

pursuant to the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P.? Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons Co., Inc.. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991); State of Utah, bv and
through Utah State Department of Social Services v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1983).
2.

Did the Trial Court clearly abuse its discretion in ruling that Mr. Kearns

failed to show that the default judgment against him was due to "excusable neglect"?
The ruling

of the District Court is entitled to considerable discretion and the

Appellate Court is not to interfere with the broad discretion of the Trial Court absent
a showing of clear abuse of that discretion.

Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State

Insurance Department. 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92
(Utah 1986).
3.

Did the Trial Court clearly abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant

failed to show he had a meritorious defense? The standard of review has been
misstated by the Appellant. The latest statement of the standard on whether a Trial
Court has correctly denied a motion to set aside a default judgment was stated by
this Court in Black's Title. Inc. v. Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607
(Utah App. 1999). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the proper legal
standard for determining whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law which
00_40366 CEC wpd
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is reviewed for correctness (Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders. Inc..
882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994)).

However, in subsequent cases, this particular

correctness standard has been applied so the Trial Court's decision will not be
interfered with unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of its considerable
discretion. Black's Title, Inc.. 991 P.2d at 610; Katz. 732 P.2d at 93. Thus, the
Appellant's statement that no deference is given to the trial judge's decision appears
to be an erroneous statement of the standard of review with regard the determination
of whether a meritorious defense exists.
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P.. provides, in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may in
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, .surprise, or excusable
neglect;.. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3) not more than three months after
the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
Rule 58A, U.R.Civ.P.. states in pertinent part as follows:
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision
(a) hereof, and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation and register of actions and
judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real
property, when the same is signed and filed as hereinabove
provided. The Clerk shall immediately make a notation of the
judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket.
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Section 78-31 a-4, Utah Code Ann.
(1)
The Court, upon motion of any party showing the
existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to
arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an
arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or
deny arbitration accordingly.
(2)
If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged
arbitration agreement is involved in an action or proceeding
pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear motions to
compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court.
Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper
venue.
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(A) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous
or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include
single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The Court may order that
the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(B) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other papers one that is not grounded in
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper inopposed for the purpose of delay
is one inopposed for any improper purpose such as to harass,
cause needless increase in the costs of litigation, or gain time
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief or
other paper.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This matter concerns an appeal from the denial of the Defendant Michael J.
Kearns' ("Kearns") Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment entered against him
and in favor of Plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo").
As in all cases reviewing a trial court's decision to refuse to set aside a default
judgment, the issues concern whether (1) the defendant timely filed a motion to set
aside the default judgment; (2) the defendant showed excusable neglect as required
by Rule 60(b)(1); and, (3) if there was a sufficient showing of excusable neglect,
whether the defendant demonstrated a meritorious defense.
After full briefing by the parties concerning the facts and circumstances
surrounding the complaint, Kearns' conduct after being served with the Complaint,
the arguments regarding the alleged timeliness of the filing of his motion, his alleged
excusable neglect, and his alleged meritorious defense, the Trial Court correctly
determined that Kearns' motion was meritless and denied the Motion to Set Aside
the Default Judgment leaving the Judgment in place.
B.

Course of Proceedings

On August 9,1999, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a Complaint against
Michael J. Kearns stemming from a dispute arising from a line of credit agreement
entered into between Mr. Kearns and Wells Fargo Bank. The Complaint was served
upon Mr. Kearns by substitute service on his wife, Miriam Kearns, on August 23,
00_40366 CEC wpd
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1999. When no answer was filed, default pleadings were submitted to the Third
Judicial District Court on September 13, 1999. On September 23, 1999, the
Honorable Judge Peuler signed the Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant in the total amount of $272,390.03. After the entry of the Default
Judgment, Wells Fargo Bank entered in a course of post-judgment collection
proceedings, including the issuance of a Writ of Execution, Writs of Garnishment and
a Motion and Order Supplemental Proceeding. On December 27, 1999, Michael
Kearns filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. After the matter was fully
briefed by the parties, Judge Peuler ruled by Minute Entry denying the Defendant's
Motion. A final Order was entered by the Court on March 1, 2000, denying Michael
Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.
C.

Disposition of Trial Court

The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler denied Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the
Default Judgment stating in her minute entry that the ruling was based upon the
arguments raised and set forth in Wells Fargo's Memorandum in Opposition to
Michael Kearns' Motion. A final Order was entered by Judge Peuler on March 1,
2000.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As Appellant did not set forth a statement of facts as required by Rule
24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee sets them forth as follows:
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1.

On January 28,1998, Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Kearns") signed

a Line of Credit Application securing a line of credit from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
("Wells Fargo") in the amount of $250,000.00. (R. 5-10).
2.

On or about February 13, 1998, Kearns used the line of credit by

obtaining a cashier's check in the amount of $250,000.00. (R. 2, 140).
3.

Kearns made the required interest payments on the line of credit from

June 1998 through December 1998 at which time Kearns ceased making payments.
(R. 115).
4.

On or about August 9, 1999, Wells Fargo filed a Complaint against

Kearns with the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake
Department, to collect the outstanding loan. (R. 1-10).
5.

On August 23, 1999, Kearns was served with a Complaint through

substitute service on Kearns' wife, Miriam C. Kearns at Kearns' principal residence.
(R. 13-15).
6.

At the time of the service of the Complaint, Kearns was involved in

separate litigation entitled In the Matter of the THOMAS F. KEARNS JR. and MARY
DURKIN KEARNS Trust, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Case
Number 993900489, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick ("Thomas Kearns
Trust Action"). (R. 116, 142-168).

00_40366 CEC wpd

7

7.

Keams was represented by attorneys Eric C. Olson and Matthew K.

Richards of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action.
(R. 116,142-168).
8.

On or about August 26,1999, three (3) days after being served with

the subject Complaint, Kearns filed a Reply Memorandum in the Thomas Kearns
Trust Action. (R. 142-155). (See. Addendum #1.)
9.

In the Reply Memorandum filed by Kearns in the Thomas Kearns Trust

Action, it states that "Michael has been sued by the very entity that owes him a
fiduciary duty". (R. 151) (See. Addendum # 1 at page 10.)
10.

In support of the Reply Memorandum filed in the Thomas Kearns Trust

Action, Kearns filed a personal sworn Affidavit entitled "Second Affidavit of Michael
J. Kearns". This was signed by Kearns on August 26, 1999 and subscribed and
sworn in front of a notary public three (3) days after being served with the subject
Complaint. (R. 157-167). (See. Addendum # 2.)
11.

In this Second Affidavit, Kearns states on August 26,1999, as follows:

"On August 23, 1999,1 was served with a Summons and Complaint, dated August
9, 1999, and attached hereto as Exhibit Q whereby the bank initiated litigation
against me seeking payment of the entire loan amount, interest and litigation costs."
(R. 166-167). (See. Addendum # 2, Page 10, paragraph 37.)
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12.

The Exhibit Q referenced in the Kearns Trust Action is the Wells Fargo

complaint which initiated this action. (R. 117, fl 16; R 170-181). (See. Addendum
#2.)
13.

On September 13, 1999, Wells Fargo submitted the subject Default

Judgment with the Third Judicial District Court with accompanying documents. (R.
16-21).
14.

On September 23,1999, (30 days after Kearns was served) the Default

Judgment was signed by the Honorable Judge Sandra Peuler and filed by the Clerk
of the Court. (R. 22-23). On September 27, 1999, the Default Judgment was
entered in the registry of judgments. (R. 22). (See Addendum #3.)
15.

The Default Judgment was entered against Kearns and in favor of Wells

Fargo in the sum of $266,351.85 with costs in the sum of $107.00, attorney's fees
in the sum of $837.00, and interest in the sum of $5,094.18, fora total Judgment of
$272,390.03. (R. 22-23).
16.

On September 29,1999, Wells Fargo, by and through its counsel, filed

and mailed a Notice of Entry of Default Judgment to Kearns which was filed with the
Court on October 1, 1999. (R. 26-27). This Notice identified the entry date of the
judgment as September 23, 1999.
17.

On or about September 29,1999, Wells Fargo filed a Motion and Order

in Supplemental Proceedings which was issued requiring Kearns to appear for
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examination on October 26, 1999. The Order in Supplemental Proceedings was
served on Kearns on October 6, 1999. (R. 44-46).
18.

On or about October 4,1999, Wells Fargo had issued multiple Writs of

Garnishment, including a Writ of Continuing Wage Garnishment upon Kearns' own
company, Michael J. Kearns dba Michael J. Kearns & Associates. This was served
on the company on October 6, 1999.

Neither Kearns nor his company ever

responded to the Writ of Garnishment. (R. 50-55).
19.

On or about October 5, 1999, Wells Fargo had issued a Writ of

Execution which was served upon Kearns or his wife on October 6, 1999. At the
time of service, Kearns' 1986 Saab and 1996 Saab were towed and held pending
an execution sale. (R. 38-39).
20.

On October 6 and 7,1999, Mark S. Swan, Wells Fargo's attorney, was

contacted by Jerome Mooney, who represented himself to be Kearns' attorney,
regarding a possible settlement of the subject claim. (R. 101-102).
21.

On October 19, 1999, Kearns sent correspondence to Richard M.

Kovacevich, President of Wells Fargo & Company in which he stated:
"That I owe this money has never been in question.. . . I have
never stated anything to the contrary...." (R. 183-184).
22.

On October 22, 1999, Mark S. Swan prepared and mailed

correspondence to Jerome Mooney informing him of Wells Fargo's intention to move
forward with the Supplemental Order examination which was scheduled for October
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26, 1999, due to the fact that Kearns had not responded to the garnishments, and
the need to proceed forward with collection of the Judgment. (R. 102).
23.

On October 26, 1999, an attorney for Wells Fargo attended the

Supplemental Order Examination. Neither Kearns nor his attorney, Jerry Mooney,
attended the examination. (R. 102).
24.

On November 3, 1999, Mark S. Swan had another telephone

conversation with Jerry Mooney regarding possible settlement of this matter. (R.
102).
25.

On November 5,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to Jerome

Mooney regarding the possible settlement of the matter and the need to settle this
matter quickly because of the accruing interest and the storage fees which were
increasing daily on the two Saabs being held under the Writ of Execution. (R. 102).
26.

On or about November 9,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to

Jerome Mooney withdrawing the unilateral forbearance from collection due to
Kearns' misrepresentations, and Wells Fargo served a Writ of Non-Wage
Garnishment (Post-Judgment) upon Donald J. Showalter, Trust Manager for Wells
Fargo Bank, Private Client Services, and successfully seized an amount sufficient
to pay the judgment in full. (R. 102).
27.

On

November

9,

1999,

Jerome

Mooney

sent

responding

correspondence to Mark S. Swan indicating that Kearns would pay off the judgment
before November 22, 1999. (R. 102).
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28.

On or about December 2,1999, Kearns delivered to Wells Fargo a Bank

One Official Check in the amount of $282,325.08, satisfying the full judgment against
him. (R. 120).
29.

On December 8,1999, Wells Fargo filed a Satisfaction of Judgment with

this Court and released the Garnishment. (R. 73-74).
30.

On Monday, December 27,1999, Kearns filed this Motion to Set Aside

Default Judgment. (R. 77-80).
31.

In Support of Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Kearns

filed his own Affidavit and an Affidavit of his wife, Miriam C. Kearns. (R. 95-100).
(See, Addendum # 4.)
32.

After Kearns' Memorandum in Support, Wells Fargo's Memorandum in

Opposition and Kearns' Reply Memorandum, and the Motion were duly submitted
to the Court, the Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler ruled pursuant to a minute entry
on January 31,2000, that Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was not
well taken. (R. 207-208).
33.

On March 1, 2000, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Third Judicial

District Court Judge, signed the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment, which was filed with the Court on March 2, 2000. (R. 241-243).
34.

On March 28, 2000, Kearns filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order

Denying Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 244-246).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
INTRODUCTION
This Court should uphold the decision of the Trial Court by finding it did not
clearly abuse its considerable discretion in denying Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the
Default Judgment. The Motion to Set Aside was filed three (3) days late. There are
sufficient facts and circumstances to show that the default judgment resulted from
Kearns' lack of due diligence and due to Kearns' inexcusable neglect. Even if
Kearns exercised due diligence and had excusable neglect, the Trial Court did not
clearly abuse its discretion in denying Kearns' motion due to the lack of a meritorious
defense. Kearns has continuously admitted owing the obligation, and therefore,
there is no meritorious defense.
Lastly, there are sufficient other grounds for this Court to uphold the Trial
Court's decision and find that there was not a clear abuse of the Trial Court's broad
discretion.
After review of the facts and circumstances surrounding this appeal, this Court
should affirm the Trial Court's decision and grant Wells Fargo damages against
Kearns or Kearns' attorney pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS FILED
MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.
It appears from numerous appellate decisions in this state that the first inquiry
regarding a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is whether the motion was timely filed. Black's
Title, 991 P.2d at 610; Richins. 817 P.2d at 387; and Musselman, 667 P.2d at 105556. While this does not appear to be the basis of the Trial Court's ruling, this is an
important issue for this Court to consider. Since the dates are without dispute, it
would appear that the application of the timing rule contained in Rule 60(b), as that
is defined by Rule 58A, would be a question of easy determination and result in
summary disposition of this matter.
It is without dispute that the Default Judgment in this case was signed on
September 23, 1999, and was stamped "Filed District Court Third Judicial District
September 23, 1999, by K. Grotepas, Deputy Clerk"' on its face. (R. 22-23). (See,
Addendum # 3.) It is also without dispute that this same Default Judgment was
entered in the Registry of Judgments on September 27,1999. (R. 22). (Addendum
#3.) It is without dispute that Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was
filed with the Third District Court on December 27, 1999, at 4:22 p.m. (R. 77-80).
Thus, Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment can only be considered
timely if the 3-month time period begins running from September 27,1999, the date
of entry into the Registry of Judgments.
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If the time period began running on

September 23,1999, then the Kearns' Motion was untimely. An untimely motion to
set aside default judgment is a fatal defect, which renders other inquiries under Rule
60(b) moot. M.L.v.V.H.. 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Rule 60(b) states that "the motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than three months after the judgment, order or
proceeding was entered or taken." (emphasis added). Wells Fargo believes that
the phrase "entered or taken" in Rule 60(b), must be defined and construed in
connection with the language of Rule 58A(b) and (c). Rule 58A states as follows:
(b)
Judgment in other cases.
Except as provided in
Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all
judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
(emphasis added)
(c)
When judgment entered; notation and register of actions
and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be
deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of lien on
real property, when the same is signed and filed as
hereinabove provided. The clerk shall immediately make a
notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the
judgment docket, (emphasis added)
The language of Rule 58A says "filed with the Clerk," not "filed by the Clerk".
That language would indicate that once the Judge signs the Judgment and gives it
to the court clerk (i.e. files it) that it is a final judgment regardless of when it is
entered in the register of actions and the judgment docket. In this case it is without
dispute that the Judgment was signed by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Third
Judicial District Court Judge, on September 23,1999. It is also without question that
it was filed with the Clerk of the Court on September 23, 1999. (See. Court stamp
00_40366 CEC wpd

15

on Addendum # 3.) Consequently, the term "entered" in Rule 60(b) is defined by
Rule 58A(b) and (c). Since a judgment is entered when it is signed and filed "with
the clerk" then it should be without dispute that the judgment in this case was
"entered" on September 23,1999. The use of September 27,1999, the date when
Judgment was filed in the Judgment Register is not the date of entry for Rule 60(b)
purposes.
Kearns filed his Motion to Set Aside on Monday, December 27,1999, more
than three months after the judgment was "entered". To be timely, it should have
been filed by Friday, December 24,1999. As it was untimely, it should have been
denied by the Trial Court on that basis alone. Kearns was specifically informed of
the date of the entry of the Judgment pursuant to a Notice of Entry of Default
Judgment filed on behalf of Wells Fargo, which was mailed to Kearns on September
30,1999. (R. 26-27). Not only did Kearns have actual notice, but his counsel, once
involved in this matter on October 7, 1999 (R. 102), had a personal obligation to
check with the Clerk of the Court as to the date of entry. See. Automatic Control
Products Corp. v. Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258,1260 (Utah 1989). Thus, there can
be no argument that his attorney did not have notice and sufficient time to file the
motion in a timely manner.
Thus, this Court should determine that the Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment was without merit because it was untimely.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT KEARNS' FAILURE
TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT WAS NOT DUE TO EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
Kearns claims that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing the vacate
the Judgment because Kearns alleges that he had sufficient "excusable neglect" to
meet the standards under Rule 60(b)(1) to set aside the default judgment.
Unfortunately in support of his argument, Kearns skews the law by only quoting
language that talks about the policy of allowing a party to have his day in court.
What Kearns does not do is appropriately cite to this Court any of the cases defining
the balancing that is to be used in finding "excusable neglect" and how that term is
defined and applied in specific circumstances. When these cases are reviewed and
applied, it is clear that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Kearns' neglect was not excusable under the specific facts of this case.
The policy considerations set forth by Kearns are not nearly as one-sided as
they appear from his brief. In discussing these policy considerations, the Utah
Supreme Court in Airkem Intermountain v. Parker. 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429
(1973), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in
refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of public
policy demand more than a mere statement than a person did
not have his day in court when full opportunity for a hearing
was afforded to him or his representative. The movant must
show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented
from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control,
id- 431 (emphasis in bold added).
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See also. Black's Title. Inc.. 991 P.2d at 611.
This excusable neglect standard has also been described as the "exercise of
'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini
Spas. Inc. v. Industrial Commission. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). See also.
Meadow Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Utah State University Department of Agriculture and
Applied Science. 813 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991).
Kearns was never prevented from appearing. Rather than showing "due
diligence", the facts show that Kearns made a conscious decision to not answer the
Complaint and knowingly accepted the consequences.
Kearns was served with the Complaint on August 23, 1999, through
substitute service on Kearns' wife. The Complaint stemmed from Kearns' failure to
make the minimum interest payments on a $250,000.00 line of credit with Wells
Fargo and subsequent refusal to pay the full amount of the loan after acceleration.
Kearns claims in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit that "[d]ue to my wife's preoccupation
with sustaining my son's life, she neglected to bring the Complaint to my attention
for several days" (emphasis added) (Addendum #4). Kearns states in paragraph
4 of his Affidavit that "[o]nce Mrs. Kearns alerted me to the Complaint, I failed to file
an answer or bring it to my attorney's attention due to my own preoccupation with
my son's condition" (emphasis added) (Addendum #2). Apparently these "facts" are
supposed to show that Kearns did not give the Complaint to his attorney before the
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default was entered. These alleged "facts" are the only sworn statements given by
Kearns to support his claim of excusable neglect.
Assuming that Kearns' son was in fact ill, it is clear that this had nothing to do
with Kearns' ability to timely answer the Complaint1. Kearns' wife did not wait
"several days" before giving the subject Complaint to Kearns. On August 26,1999,
Kearns filed the Second Affidavit of Michael J. Kearns in the Thomas Kearns Trust
Action (Addendum #2). This Affidavit was filed three days after the subject
Complaint was served on Kearns' wife. Kearns stated in the Second Affidavit
that:
"On August 23, 1999, I was served with a summons and complaint,
dated August 9, 1999, and attached hereto as Exhibit Q, whereby the
Bank initiated litigation against me seeking payment of the entire loan
amount, interest, and litigation costs."
Because Kearns refers to the Complaint in his Affidavit and attaches it as an exhibit
on August 26,1999, Kearns' statement that his wife failed to give him the Complaint
for "several days" must mean three days or less.
Additionally, Kearns' sworn statement that he failed to bring the Complaint to
his attorney's attention due to his preoccupation with his son's condition is false. In
the Thomas Kearns Trust Action, Kearns was represented by Eric C. Olson and
Matthew K. Richards of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie. Kearns' attorneys filed
1

Even if Kearns' son was ill, inconvenience or press of personal or
business affairs does not constitute excusable neglect. Valley Leasing v. Houghton,
661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983), nor does even personal illness, Warren v. Dixon Ranch
Co.. 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1983).
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a Reply Memorandum in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action on August 26,1999,
three days after the service of the subject Complaint. On page 10 of the Reply
Memorandum, Kearns' attorneys stated that:
". . .[OJnce Michael followed through with his threats to seek a new
trustee, collection efforts began and Michael now has been sued by
the very entity that owes him a fiduciary duty."
Thus, Kearns not only informed his attorneys of the subject Complaint, he supplied
his attorneys with the Complaint, and his attorneys used the subject Complaint as
an exhibit in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action only three days after it was served
on Kearns' wife. Thus, Kearns' attorneys had at least until September 23,1999, (the
date of the Default Judgment) to answer the Complaint, or 28 days from the date it
was used by Kearns and his attorneys in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action. Kearns
and his attorneys' failure to timely answer was not the result of "excusable neglect."
The excuse that Kearns offers to support his claim of "excusable neglect" and
to pass that test that he used the due diligence of an ordinary person in responding
to the complaint was that he was "preoccupied" with his son's illness. However, this
statement is insufficient to establish excusable neglect. The effect of illness in
demonstrating "excusable neglect" has been reviewed several times by Utah courts.
The most recent application of the illness claim is as follows:
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[ijllness
alone is not sufficient to make neglect in defending one's aclions
excusable." Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416,420-21,
260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953). A movant seeking relief may not
simply rest on the assertion that he was ill to excuse his
inactions; he must show that the nature of the illness
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incapacitated him such that he was unable to act. See, Id. at
743 (We are not told the nature of the illness and it does not
appear that the appellant. . .was so incapacitated the he could
not have called an attorney to have his rights and the rights of
the corporation protected"). Here, Black merely asserted that he
was under a doctor's care and unable to work. He neither
described the illness, nor explained how it wholly prevented
him from taking the steps required to remain in contact with
counsel, Black's Title or the Department. In the absence of
such showing, Black's assertion does not demonstrate his
neglect was excusable, (emphasis added).
Black's Title. 991 P.2d at 611. There are no facts that show that the illness of
Kearns' son was of such an extensive nature that it "incapacitated" Kearns such that
he was unable to act and that it "wholly prevented him" from responding to the
Complaint. In fact, it is quite clear that the illness did not prevent Kearns from using
the Complaint and communicate with his attorney in another court action. An
answer to the subject Complaint, would presumably have been a simple pleading,
such as a general denial, if Kearns claimed he did not owe the money (even though
he has always admitted that the owed the money).
Based upon the above, Kearns is clearly attempting to mislead this Court.
Kearns' failure to answer the subject Complaint was not caused by excusable
neglect, but appears to be the result of a conscious decision not to answer, or
through pure indifference on the part of Kearns2. Kearns did not use due diligence
after receiving the subject Complaint and was not incapacitated or wholly prevented

This Court can conclude, based upon the facts, that Kearns's failure to
respond to the Complaint was a deliberate choice. Board of Education of Granite
School District v. Cox. 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963).
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from answering the Complaint by circumstances which were outside his control. In
fact, Kearns was in total control of the circumstances. Therefore, Kearns' Motion to
Set Aside Default Judgment must was correctly denied.
POINT III
KEARNS DOES NOT HAVE A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.
The first inquiries on a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a default judgment are
whether the motion is timely filed and whether there has been sufficient excusable
neglect. Black's Title, id- at 610. Only after those two thresholds are resolved in
favor of the movant, does the issue of meritorious defense arise. If Kearns cannot
persuade this Court that the Trial Court clearly abused its discretion with regard to
the first two levels of inquiry, then the issue of meritorious defense is not even
considered. Thus, a movant may have a meritorious defense, but if he fails the
timeliness or the excusable neglect standards, the movant will not be entitled to
relief. See. State of Utah by and through Utah State Dept. of Social Services v.
Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983); Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All
American Life Insurance Co.. 978 P.2d 465, 470, fn 5 (Utah App. 1999); Miller v.
Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 690, 693-94 (Utah App. 1992); Board of Education of Granite
School Dist. V. Cox. 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (1963). Kearns has not been
able to demonstrate the initial threshold elements necessary to set aside the Default
Judgment and the Trial Court's decision should be affirmed.
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Notwithstanding these initial elements, Kearns cannot satisfy the final element
as he has not set forth a meritorious defense. The single greatest reason why
Kearns cannot set forth a meritorious defense is that he has admitted to the debt
owed to Wells Fargo and has never disputed his obligation to Wells Fargo. Kearns
has never filed a proposed answer. The filing of a proposed answer appears to be
a requirement in setting forth a meritorious defense. See, Erickson v. Schenkers
International Forwarders. Inc.. 882 P.2d 1147, 1149-50 (Utah 1994); and
i
Musselman. ]d. at 1058. Thus, without a proposed answer before it and with the fact
that Kearns has never denied liability and in fact has admitted liability subsequent
to the filing of the Complaint, the Trial Court correctly determined that there was no
meritorious defense. The purpose of the meritorious defense rule is to "prevent the
necessity of judicial review of questions, which, on the face of the pleadings are
frivolous." Musselman. 667 P.2d at 1060; see also. Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149.
The defenses raised by Kearns in both his brief before this Court and before the Trial
Court do not raise a meritorious defense to the underlying claim of liability.
A.

Kearns' claim that the Complaint should have been
adjudicated in arbitration is not a meritorious defense.

Kearns correctly sets forth the language regarding arbitration. However,
Kearns fails to discuss the specific language of that paragraph and its application in
the present context. Upon review and application of this language, it is clear that the
arbitration paragraph does not give rise to a meritorious defense in and of itself.
The pertinent language of the paragraph is as follows:
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You agree that any Dispute not resolved informally, regardless
of when it arose, will be settled in accordance with the terms of
the Arbitration Program at the election of any party.. .A party
to a Dispute may by summary proceeding bring any action in
court to compel arbitration of any Dispute.
It is undisputed that Keams did not timely "elect" to have the dispute between
the parties arbitrated. The option of arbitration was first raised in Keams' Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment. The arbitration agreement does not prohibit Wells
Fargo from filing a lawsuit against Kearns. What the contract provides is an
opportunity for Kearns to elect arbitration if he chooses once a lawsuit is filed against
him. If he allows a judgment to be entered before he elects arbitration, than that
right is waived. Kearns should not be able to demand arbitration now, especially
since he admits the debt and has paid the Judgment. This is consistent with the
Utah Arbitration Act, § 78-31 a-4, which gives a party an option to motion a court to
compel the parties to arbitrate if there is an arbitration agreement.
The only issue that was entitled to be tried was whether Kearns owed an
obligation to Wells Fargo. Since the obligation is admitted by Keams, the argument
made by Kearns to have the judgment set aside violates the policy of the meritorious
defense rule, which is to avoid judicial review of questions and pleadings which are
without merit or frivolous. See. Erickson. 882 P.2d at 1149 and Musselman. 667
P.2dat1060.
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B.

The award of attorney's fees in the Judgment and the
potential existence for a Counterclaim do not establish a
meritorious defense.

Kearns argues that somehow he was prejudiced by Wells Fargo being
awarded attorney's fees and costs. However, this is not an issue that raises a
meritorious defense. The fees awarded in the Judgment were the total of $837.00
(R. 23), which was set forth in the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (R. 17-21). The fees
would certainly have been greater based upon the standard fee schedule of the
American Arbitration Association as the filing fee to initiate an arbitration with a panel
of three arbitrators is more than the fee awarded by the Court. Further, it is clear
that since Kearns admits the debt that attorney's fees and costs would have been
awarded regardless. Thus, this issue of attorney's fees does not establish a
"meritorious defense" to the question of liability.
Kearns' claim that he has potential lender liability claims against Wells Fargo
which could offset the undisputed obligation is also not sufficient to set forth a
meritorious defense.

Kearns has never filed a proposed counterclaim or any

document that would identify the nature and extent of the alleged lender liability
claims. In fact, the term "lender liability claims" was used for the first time in Kearns'
Reply Brief in support of his Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. (R. 194-204).
A claim or defense described no better than "lender liability claims" cannot be
deemed to raise a meritorious defense because it alleges no facts pursuant to which
a court can fulfill its obligations to review the proposed answer and determine as a
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matter of law whether it contains a defense which is entitled to be tried. Musselman.
667 P.2d at 1058, Erickson. 882 P.2d at 1148-49.
Therefore, Kearns' original Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was
justifiably denied by the Trial Court even if Kearns could appropriately show the
motion was filed in a timely manner and that there was sufficient excusable neglect.
There have been no meritorious defenses presented to the obligations owed to
Weils Fargo, particularly in light of Mr. Kearns' repeated admission that he "has
never refuted that he owed Wells Fargo $250,000.00 plus interest".

(See.

Appellant's Brief at page 15). Consequently, the trial court's decision denying the
Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment should be affirmed.
POINT IV
A BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN
DENYING KEARNS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
As stated previously, this Court is only to reverse the Trial Court if it clearly
abused its broad discretion in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment. Black's
Title. Inc.. 991 P.2d 607 at 610. The application of this rule is on a case by case
basis as noted by the Utah Supreme Court:
The trial court has broad discretion to balance the equities on a
case-by-case basis, including such considerations as the
preference to allow the presentation of all claims and defenses,
any delay or unfairness of a party's conduct, the need for finality
of judgments, and the respective hardships in denying or
granting relief. See, Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416,
260 P.2d 471 (1953); Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah
1981); Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, supra.
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Kate, 732 P.2d at 96 (fn 2).
There is a particular need for the Court to balance the equities of this case.
First of all, Kearns' admission of the debt seems to indicate that there is no equitable
reason for the judgment to be set aside and to cause both parties to incur additional
attorney's fees and waste judicial resources. There is also the fact that this debt and
Judgment was paid by Kearns within the three-month time period to file the Motion
to Set Aside the Default Judgment, and as a result, Kearns received a Satisfaction
of Judgment. This fact creates an additional factor for consideration by the Court.
In Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n, Inc.. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
.. . both the six-month delay and the fact of prior satisfaction show
that the motion was not made within a reasonable time. While we
decline plaintiffs' invitation to go so far as to say that a judgment once
knowingly and voluntarily satisfied becomes extinguished and is
therefore never subject to modification, see Mitchell v. Lindlv. Okl., 351
P.2d 1063 (1960), we do consider the fact of prior satisfaction an
important consideration in determining whether the moti«*r» to
modify was made within a reasonable time. The possibility of
prejudice to the nonmoving party increases significantly when the
judgment has already been paid, (emphasis added)
The following chronology of events shows that Kearns consciously decided
to allow the judgment to stand and post-judgment collection efforts to proceed
forward. Kearns had multiple opportunities to timely object to the Default Judgment.
Kearns' actions show a pattern of waiver and laches, and thus Kearns should not
now be allowed to reopen a case that is now closed, particularly when he voluntarily
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paid the judgment to receive a Satisfaction of Judgment and a Release of
Garnishment.
1.
After obtaining the default judgment, Wells Fargo filed Motion and Order
in Supplemental Proceedings on September 29, 1999. The Order required the
Kearns to appear on October 26, 1999. The Order was served on Kearns on
October 6, 1999.
2.
On October 4, 1999, Wells Fargo caused Writs of Garnishment to be
issued, one of which was on Kearns' company, Michael J. Kearns dba Michael J.
Kearns & Associates. This garnishee, controlled by Kearns, never responded to the
garnishment.
3.
Wells Fargo caused to be issued a Writ of Execution on October 5,
1999, which was served on October 6,1999. At this time both of Kearns' vehicles,
a 1986 Saab and a 1996 Saab, were towed and held pending an execution sale.
Kearns never requested a hearing or filed an objection to the seizure.
4.
On October 7, 1999, Mark S. Swan, attorney for Wells Fargo, was
contacted by Jerry Mooney, Kearns' attorney, regarding a possible settlement of the
subject claim. Mr. Swan was amenable to settlement of the matter and waited for
Mr. Mooney to get back to him regarding settlement.
5.
On October 19, 1999, Kearns sent correspondence to Richard M.
Kovacevich, President of Wells Fargo & Company in which he stated, "That I owe
this money has never been in question. . . . I have never stated anything to the
contrary. . . . "
6.
On October 21, 1999, Mark S. Swan prepared and mailed
correspondence to Jerry Mooney informing him of Wells Fargo's intention to move
forward with the Supplemental Order Examination which was scheduled for October
26, 1999, due to the fact that Kearns' company had not responded to the
garnishments, and the need to proceed forward with judgment collection. Mr. Swan
sent this correspondence because of the fact that settlement negotiations were not
moving forward.
7.
On October 26, 1999, Wells Fargo's attorneys attended the
Supplemental Order Examination. Neither Kearns nor any of his attorneys attended
the hearing.
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8.
On November 2, 1999, a Bench Warrant was issued against Kearns
because of his violation of the Court Order requiring him to appear for a
supplemental examination.
9.
On November 3, 1999, Mark S. Swan had another telephone
conversation with Jerry Mooney regarding possible settlement of this matter.
10. On November 5,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to Jerome
Mooney regarding the possible settlement of the matter and the need to settle this
matter quickly because of the interest and storage fees which were increasing daily
on the two Saabs which were being held pursuant to the execution.
11.
On November 9,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to Jerome
Mooney withdrawing the unilateral forbearance from collection due to Kearns'
misrepresentations, and Wells Fargo caused a Writ of Garnishment to be served on
the Trust Department of Wells Fargo Bank and successfully seized an amount
sufficient to pay the judgment in full. Kearns did not file an objection to the
garnishment.
12. On November 9, 1999, Jerome Mooney sent responding
correspondence to Mark S. Swan indicating that Kearns would pay off the judgment
before November 22, 1999.
13. On or about December 2,1999, Kearns-delivered to Wells Fargo a Bank
One Officiai Check in the amount of $282,325.08, satisfying the full judgment against
him.
14. On December 8,1999, Wells Fargo filed a Satisfaction of Judgment with
this Court and submitted a Release of Garnishment to the necessary entities.
Obviously, Kearns and his attorneys allowed the judgment collection process
to go forward without ever attempting to timely set aside the Default Judgment,
despite multiple opportunities to demand hearings in the post-judgment collection
proceedings. Kearns refused to participate in any of the post-judgment collection
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proceedings. While Mr. Mooney has been representing Kearns in this matter3 at
least since October 7,1999, the Motion to Set Aside was his first formal appearance
in this case. Only after the judgment was voluntarily paid, and Wells Fargo filed a
Satisfaction of Judgment with this Court, did Kearns belatedly file the Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment. Wells Fargo was forced to go to considerable time and
expense in collecting the underlying debt before it was voluntarily paid. Therefore,
Kearns' delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and the fact of prior
satisfaction show that the Motion was not filed within a reasonable time and the
attorney's fees Wells Fargo is now paying after the judgment was satisfied creates
a substantial prejudice to it created solely by Kearns' tactics. Kearns' actions
constitute waiver and/or laches thereby equitably estopping Kearns from having the
Judgment set aside.
These factors coupled with the deemed admission by Kearns of the obligation
and the possibility of prejudice to Wells Fargo since the Judgment has already been
paid, are additional grounds upon which this Court can uphold the Trial Court's
decision. It is well established law in the state of Utah that this Court should affirm
the decision of the Trial Court if it can do so on any ground. See. Matter of Estate

Messrs. Larsen and Mooney represented Kearns before and at the time
the subject Complaint was served as they were representing Kearns in another case
pending before the Third Judicial District Court, Michael J. Kearns v. Richard Howa.
Harry Rosenthal and Connie Mallet. Case No. 990904000, filed April 13, 1999,
before Judge Noel, which case is still pending. (R. 127). Thus, at the time of service,
Kearns had two law firms working for him.
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ofSheplev. 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah
1980). Thus, Wells Fargo would request this Court to find that there are sufficient
equitable grounds in addition to legal grounds to uphold the Trial Court's decision to
deny the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment and thereby affirm the Trial
Court's decision in allowing the Default Judgment to stand.
POINT V
KEARNS' AFFIDAVIT IS FRIVOLOUS, AND THEREFORE WELLS FARGO
SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
Pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, if this Court
determines that Kearns' appeal is either frivolous or for delay, it may award just
damages that may include single or double costs and/or reasonable attorney's fees
to Wells Fargo. This Court has the option of ordering that the damages be paid by
Kearns or Kearns' attorney. The standard for frivolous appeal does not require a
finding of bad faith. O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A frivolous
appeal is one that has no reasonable legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd.
Partnership v.Hall. 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Mauqhan. 770
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A frivolous appeal also has been defined as "[o]ne
in which no justiciable question has been presented and. . .is readily recognizable
as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed". Hunt v.
Hurst. 785 P.2d 414,416 (Utah 1990); see also, Farrel) v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299,302
(Utah App. 1992).
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Kearns' claim that he has satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b) is full of
conclusory statements and platitudes with no substantive factual basis. As such,
both his motion before the trial court and his current appeal are totally absent of the
facts and law necessary to show the requisite elements necessary to obtain relief
under Rule 60(b)(1). It does not appear that the arguments raised by Kearns are
grounded in material fact or warranted by existing law. In fact, Wells Fargo believes
that Kearns is trying to manipulate the general policy of allowing a litigant to have his
day in court by how he describes this case. With the facts that Kearns has
personally admitted the debt, his attorney has acknowledged the debt subsequent
to the Judgment, and Kearns has voluntarily paid the Judgment, there is a clear
indication that there was no proper motivation for filing the original motion or this
appeal. This is especially true since Kearns' appeal is a restatement of his argument
before the Trial Court. The issue was so clear to the Trial Court that no oral
argument was needed. Kearns' actions are causing an unnecessary expense to
Wells Fargo which obtained a valid judgment on an acknowledged debt and which
has no way to obtain recompense for its attorney's fees, absent this court awarding
such fees and costs pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This
case seems to be close to the situation decried by the Utah Supreme Court in DeBrv
v. Cascade Enterprises. 935 P.2d 499, 502-03 (Utah 1997). Thus, Wells Fargo
requests this Court to find that the appeal is frivolous and not warranted in law and
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award Wells Fargo double its costs and reasonable compensation for the time and
labor expended by its attorneys in defending the appeal.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, the Trial Court correctly used its broad discretion in
denying Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment as Kearns' motion did not
meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P. Kearns did not file the Rule
60(b)(1) motion within three (3) months of the default judgment being entered by the
Court. Kearns' actions post-judgment, even if the motion were filed timely, were
such that it would be inequitable and not meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1) to
set aside the Default Judgment. The facts show that Kearns did not fail to answer
the Complaint due to excusable neglect.
Despite Kearns' statements that he was "preoccupied" with his son's illness
and did not receive the Complaint for "several days" from his wife, the facts are clear
and undisputed that he was aware of the Complaint and turned the Complaint over
to his attorneys who used it in another case within three days of Kearns' wife being
served. Thus, there was ample opportunity for Kearns and his team of attorneys to
answer a simple collection complaint. Furthermore, in light of Kearns' continual
admission that he owed the obligation to Wells Fargo, his arguments regarding
having a meritorious defense are meaningless. In light of the factors set forth above,
it would appear that this is a frivolous appeal within the definition of Rule 33, Utah
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Rules of Appellate Procedure entitling Wells Fargo to double its costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.
Wherefore, Wells Fargo respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Trial
Court's decision and find that the Trial Court did not abuse its broad discretion in
determining that there was no reason to set aside the Default Judgment. Wells
Fargo also requests that it be awarded its costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule
33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this / 7 / d a y of July, 2000.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

M/rk $. Swan
Attom'e^y for Wells Fargo/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
hereby certify that on the /7

day of July, 2000,1 caused two (2) true and

correct copies of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same
in the United States rnail, postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Mark A. Larsen
joleen S. Mantas
Larsen & Mooney Law
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM #1

Eric C. Olson (#4108)
Matthew K. Richards (#7972)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Petitioner
Michael J. Keams
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. PROBATE DIVISION

In the Matter of
THE THOMAS F. KEARNS, JR. and
MARY DURKIN KEARNS TRUST,

:

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION
TO WELLS FARGO'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:

Case No 993900489 TR

:

Judge J Dennis Frederick

:
:
:

Petitioner. Michael J. Kearns ("Michael"), through counsel, submits the following Reply
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summar. Judgment and in opposition to the Motion
for Summar. Judgment filed by Wells Fargo Bank (hereinafter "Wells Fargo " or "'the Bank").
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Counsel paints the Bank's dealings with Michael with benign colors Of course, that is
what good advocates are supposed to do for their clients However, protestations of disinterest
do not disguise the very real conflicts existing between Michael and the Bank

Because the

Bank persists in claiming a "right" as a matter of law to remain as trustee and essentially do as it
pleases under the guise of "fiduciary duty," Michael has provided a second affidavit setting forth
in greater detail the Bank's conflicts and deficiencies. The issue here is not whether this trustee
can come up with a plausible explanation for conduct at variance with the interests and desires of
the primary beneficiary, but whether this Court should embrace such explanations as sufficient
excuse for the perpetuation of a failed and suspect trustee relationship.
It must be remembered that Michael fought a long and expensive battle to keep some
portion of the Trust's Kearns Tribune stock intact. Now the Bank, in the name of its "rights" as
trustee, wants to pursue a course calculated to undermine that victory. At the same time,
Michael's mother ("PiersoF) refuses to permit a dissolution of the Trust that would allow
Michael direct control of the assets he has preserved. With the Bank now openly hostile to
Michael because of nonpayment of a loan made to him solely because of his status as beneficiary
of the Trust, among other reasons, the Court should terminate Wells Fargo as trustee and appoint
a different institutional trustee.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
The Bank disputes five of Michael's material undisputed facts but then offers several
"facts" of its own that, by reason of their generality and incomplete nature, must be disputed:
The Facts Disputed By The Bank
*\m 13, 15 of Petitioner's Memo—This quarrel is entirely semantic. The Bank has never
been willing to admit the simple fact that it followed Michael's investment advice for nearly
eighteen months with singular success. Yet, however it may choose to garnish the reality with
references to "independent judgment and discretion," the four-fold increase in the value of the
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Trust assets between September, 1997 and June, 1999 rests exclusively on Wells Fargo's
willingness to rely on Michael's judgment. Conversely, the most glaring losses and lost
opportunities in connection with the Trust are those instances in which the Bank disregarded
Michael's wishes in its ill-advised attempt to demonstrate independence.
This point, of course, lay at the heart of the disagreement over the form of affidavit
sought in the Piersol litigation. In the affidavit, the Bank insisted on characterizing its handling
of the Trust in terms that dismissed Michael's input as inconsequential which is simply not so.
In refusing to give Michael his due as the one demanding a course for the Trust that proved
extraordinarily beneficial the Bank undercut his position in the Piersol dispute.
*F 16 of Petitioner's Memo—This rationalization by the Bank is predictable but ultimately
incomprehensible. After nearly 1.5 year's success in holding the Trust asset per Michael's
request and despite the recent receipt of AT&T stock that was both blue chip and produced
dividends, the Bank felt compelled earlier this year to implement its discredited diversification
scheme at a time when those with knowledge of the market recognized AT&T's appreciating
value. Again, the Bank refuses to admit that Michaels expertise outshone Weils Fargo's slavish
adherence to the diversification plan. That the ill-advised move came mere days after Piersol
prevailed in opposing termination of the Trust merely added insult to injury.
<j

P of Petitioner's Memo—Again, the Bank opts for characterization over substance in

disputing the issue of communication between the parties. Criven Michaels unique knowledge
of the telecommunications and media industries and the complete absence of comparable
expertise at the Bank, he should be consulted in advance of investment moves, not merely
relegated to an observer's position receiving statements and notices well after the tact.
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1 19 of Petitioner's Memo—Wells Fargo unintentionally underscores the key
disagreement between the parties when it contends that Michael's "deep-seeded and irreparable
loss of confidence" is "unjustified/' At some point, the objective facts of a trustee-beneficiary
relationship rise to a level of distrust and conflict that the law deems intolerable. Wells Fargo
insists that the proffered recharacterization of its own actions and motives neutralizes any
perceived conflict. In short, the Bank belittles Michael and insinuates that his perception is
entirely mistaken. However, the facts documented in Michael's Second Affidavit dispel any
notion that the difficulties leading to the filing of this petition are nothing more than isolated
mistaken impressions.
Disputes With Respect To The Bank's ^Facts'*
*ffl 1 and 2 of Bank's Memo—The Bank's precise determination regarding its '"fiduciary
duty" is more accurately reflected in the February 9, 1998 memo of Bank officer Rees Peterson
outlining his plan to diversify as an "appropriate/prudent investment strategy/' Peterson viewed
the future appreciation of the TCI shares as unlikely and urged diversification from the one stock.
Because of Michael's objections, this did not happen at the time. This was most fortunate
because, from February, 1998 to the present, the TCI stock (now AT&T) kept intact at Michael's
insistence and contrary to Peterson's recommendation has appreciated from 53,354,208 to
ST,692,733. See Exhibit F to Second Affidavit.
The Bank's rationale for diversification seems driven principally by the need to obtain
money to pay fees to itself and to pay the nominal S416.66 annuity to PiersoL This certainly did
not warrant a wholesale disposition of 20% of the Trust assets. Further, once the TCI stock
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became dividend paying AT&T stock in February, 1999, even the need "to generate income" was
an insufficient excuse. See Wells Fargo's Memo at 7, *l 12.
A fair interpretation of the Bank's insistence on diversification is a perverse need to
define and safeguard its perceived "rights" as trustee to act independent of and without regard for
the wishes of the beneficiary. Rather than pursue a proven course advocated by an informed and
acquiescent beneficiary, the Bank confines itself to what it characterizes as a "prudent" approach
apparently as protection against a non-existent threat of liability to Michael.
«l 3 of Bank's Memo—What the Bank fails to mention is that Michael initiated both the
meeting referenced and the request to see the diversification plan. Second Affidavit *|*| 1^> 26.
^ 12 and 13 of Bank's Memo—The important point to note is that, even though "the
need to generate income for payment of Trust obligations became less crucial" with the
conversion to AT&T stock (Wells Fargo's memo at 7, <j 12), the Bank pressed forward with its
"prudent investment policy to diversify the Trust assets" by selling off 10% of the AT&T stock.
1*1 l-l and 15 of Bank's Memo—It is axiomatic that no one can predict the stock market,
but some people like beneficiary Michael Kearns have greater knowledge of a particular niche
relevant to the proposed transaction than inexperienced portfolio managers too caught up in their
Bank's "rights" as trustee to solicit and accept timely assistance. The Bank's strategy is without
nuance or insight; it is a classic "by the book" investment strategy aimed more at selfjustification than exploitation ot a unique historical block of media-based equities preserved at
great expense b> the efforts of the sole ultimate beneficiary.
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ARGUMENT
I.

WELLS FARGO HAS NO BASIS FOR OPPOSING TERMINATION OF ITS
TRUSTEESHIP.
Replacement of a trustee is a matter addressed to the sound discretion for the Court. The

determination "is rooted in equity

" Kerper v. Kemper, 780 P.2d 923, 937 (Wyo. 1989).

Reviewing courts afford such decisions considerable deference. Id. Only a result reached
"arbitrarily and capriciously . . . in disregard of the use of sound judgment regarding what is right
under the circumstances'' will result in error and reversal. Id.
Michael's petition to terminate the trustee is grounded on some very specific axeas of
conflict that have arisen unexpectedly by virtue of outside forces operating on this unique Trust.
First, the settlors of the Trust selected as trustee "Walker Bank & Trust Company," a Utah bank
with historic ties to the Kearns family. Forty-two years later, Walker Bank is no more.
Unforeseen by the settlors, three mergers and acquisitions have transformed the trustee from a
prominent local bank into a mere appendage of a nationwide bank holding company with no
demonstrable claim on the loyalty of the Trust beneficiaries.
Second, for the first forty years of its existence, the role of the trustee was custodial.
Essentially, all that the trustee did was to hold intact a controlling block of Kearns Tribune stock.
Only in the last two years, with the TCI and AT&T transactions, has the role of the Trustee
changed. Now, the trustee holds title to extremely valuable publicly trading securities in one of
the most stable and substantial quasi-utihties in the world. The trustee wants to diversify those
holdings; the sole remaining beneficiary prefers a course analogous to that charted in the first
forty years—stability and patience in preserving a large block of communications stock.
Third, although but an infant when the Trust was formed, Michael has followed what
appears to be an almost genetic business proclivity into the arena of media and communications.
6

Consequently, he has developed an interest m and knowledge of the subject matter of the Trust
that necessarily make him something more than a common bystander
Finally, despite provisions in the Trust declaring it "irrevocable," five of the six ultimate
beneficiaries combined with an income beneficiarv, Piersol, to terminate the Trust. All that
remains in the Trust are those assets derived from the block of Kearns Tribune stock that
Michael, acting in defiance of the rest of his family, fought to keep intact
The Trust today is simply not the same trust established m 1957 The trustee, the trust
assets and the beneficiaries, both m numbers and expertise, have changed radically Thus,
appeals to the settlor's choice of trustee or supposed familianty with the Trust nng hollow m the
undisputed factual context before this Court What matters is the relationship as it exists today.
So viewed, there are more than sufficient grounds to appoint a new institution to act as trustee
In the most simple terms, Wells Fargo is simply fighting for its own prerogatives—its
%4

nght" to act as trustee and obtain the benefits flowingfrom*that status (i e fees and the

assurance that its unsecured loan to Michael will be repaid) despite the fact that no one else
apparently is asking the Court to retain it in this status All Michael asks is for appointment of a
different institution to fill Wells Fargo's shoes This remedy will hurt no one and will
undeniably eliminate the hostility and conflict that has ansen from the shifting factual context
surrounding this Trust
II.

THE COMBINED IMPORT OF THE INDISPITED FACTS M A.NDATES
REPLACEMENT OF WELLS FARGO ASTRLSTEE.
A.

The Bank Has Wronglv Given Precedence To Its Conception Of
Diversification Over The Express Wishes Of The Lltimate Beneficiary.

Micnae! tought to keep the Trust a single asset trust \ et, once the Bank had the TCI
stock in its hands, it immediatelv began to agitate to diversify thereby generating administrative
7

fees and tax liabilities. Predictably, Michael requested patience consistent with the past course
that had seen an unprecedented increase in value of the Trust asset through holding the block of
stock intact. To the extent that the Trust has heeded Michael's voice, the value of the Trust has
grown, almost exponentially. Time and again, Michael's keener insight into the media business
proved right in predicting the most beneficial course for the Trust. In contrast, left to its own
devices, the Bank has sacrificed growth and appreciation for a needless retrenchment which
Michael as the sole ultimate beneficiary has opposed. Certainly, the 5416.66 annual obligation
to Piersol does not warrant liquidation of millions of dollars of stable AT&T stock with growth
potential in exchange for stagnant municipal bonds. As will be seen, the motive for
diversification necessarily runs deeper.
One can trace the conflict between Michael and the Bank from late 1997 to the present. It
is not imaginary. It is not irrational. Its effects are well documented. A knowledgeable and
aggressive beneficiary seeks to preserve the status quo for long-term growth, while the Bank
commits itself in writing to the opposite course. Through a series of missteps on the part of the
Bank and a series of undeniable successes arising from the status quo policy, Michael's
confidence in the trustee has eroded. The trustee finds it necessary to assert its authority and
v%

rights,, by locking Michael out of any consultative role and proceeding with its policy of

absolute prudence. See 63 ALR2d Hostility Between Trustee and Beneficiary as Grounds for
Removal 523, 528 & n.5, 530 & n.15; see also Lister v. Weeks. 46 A 558 (N.J. 1900) (removing
trustee because, inter aha, friction or hostility between trustee and beneficianes arose "out of the
misbehavior of the trustee").
This real conflict is brought on by the Bank's insistence on undermining the very course
that the sole remaining ultimate beneficiary sacrificed so much to preserve. That such conflict is
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unique to the circumstances of this Trust makes it no less understandable and debilitating to the
administration of the Trust. Perhaps, a substitute trustee would pursue the identical course
advocated by the Bank; however, the Bank has established a track record that calls into question
its sincerity in advocating wholesale diversification.
B.

The Jones Waldo Relationship Exacerbates An Already Tense Relationship.

The best that the Bank can say about Jones Waldo is that the law firm has never
represented Wells Fargo as trustee for this Trust. Such assurances are little comfort in light of
the expansive relationship between Jones Waldo and the Bank generally and the Bank's refusal
to disclose even an outline of that relationship to Michael. (Michael's Second Affidavit *ffl 2931-)
In practical reality, Michael is forced to deal with the trustee on an uneven playing field.
While Piersol's attorneys are the same folks who daily represent the Bank in numerous other
contexts, Michael must content himself with counsel who enjoy no such advantage. Perhaps this
accounts for Wells Fargo's inexplicable anxiety over ''protection of Ms. Piersofs interest"
despite the fact that the annual sum of S416.66 to which she is entitled is essentially
inconsequential when viewed in the context of a Trust with nearly S8 million in assets. See
Wells Fargo's Memo at 11, *f 3. In the end, Jones Waldo's dual representation of Wells Fargo
and Piersol is not alone determinative, but the relationship viewed in the context of historic
tensions between Michael and Piersol necessarily weighs in favor of appointing a new trustee.1

'As stated in Michael's prior memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment, the Bank's
communications to Michael regarding important e\ents of the Trust has been almost entirely reactive to Michael's
persistent requests for information, the information is not supplied to Michael unless he asks for it. Moreover,
Michael has repeatedly requested specific information regarding the Trust and the Bank has promised to supply it.
After many weeks. howe\er, Michael has not received the requested information. The information relates to: (1)
fees incurred by the trustee for managing the Trust, (2) communications between the trustee and the law firm
Callister Nebeker &. McCullough regarding the Trust, and (3) real estate owned by the Trust that apparently derives
a yearly revenue from mining or mineral rights. (Michael Second Affidavit €| 23.)
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C.

In Making The Unsecured Loan To Michael, The Bank Necessarily
Compromised Its Ability To Act With Impartiality And For The Sole Best
Interest Of The Beneficiary.

Several facts about the S250,000 loan emerge from Michael's Second Affidavit that
underscore the potential conflict assumed by the Bank when it elected to make the loan. First,
the loan originated with the very Bank department (Private Client Services) with which Michael
must deal regarding the Trust. Indeed, Larry Bvwater ("Bywater"), who heads that department
and who is Michael's primary contact regarding the Trust, personally facilitated the loan
premised on Michael's status as beneficiary of the Trust. Bradley Wiggins, who has offered his
testimony regarding the transaction, is Bvwater's subordinate and can testify with knowledge
only because he was the one who arranged the loan, payment of which was expressly postponed
until Michael obtained access to his portion of the Trust. (Wiggins Affidavit *{ 7.)
Second, Bvwater and Wiggins initiated the collection effort against Michael. Though
Wiggins now characterizes the collection effort as entirely 2 task for the "work-out group," the
Second Affidavit paints a much different picture. Bvwater and WTiggins took Michael to lunch in
an effort to obtain assurances regarding repayment of the loan. At the time, they gave Michael
the understanding that the Bank would not come after him because he was a valued customer. Of
course, once Michael followed through with his threats to seek a new trustee, collection efforts
began and Michael now has been sued by the very entity that owes him a fiduciary duty.
Wiggins' affidavit acknowledges certain anomalies about the loan that heighten the
Bank's conflict. It is unsecured. (Wiggins affidavit *\ 3.) Repayment of the principal is
unnecessary until the termination of the Trust (and thus the loan is dependent on the Trust itself).
(Wiggins affidavit *{ 7.) Wiggins himself initiated the steps to place the loan in collection.
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(Wiggins affidavit ^f 13.) Indeed, the check to Michael for the loan proceeds was signed by
Bywater and Wiggins. (Second Affidavit, Exhibit 0.)
More than any other point raised by Michael, this state of affairs is rife with conflicts for
the Bank as trustee. The Bank as trustee will disperse Trust income to Michael against which, as
a judgment creditor, it must seek execution. The Bank as trustee must manage and invest Trust
assets that, as a creditor of Michael, it views as the sole source for repayment of principal. Cf.
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research v. Holman, 732 P.2d 974, 986 (Wash, 1987) (removing
trustee who had charged excessive fees because, by virtue of court order mandating repayment of
fees, he became both debtor of the trust and creditor as trustee). Also, members of its Private
Client Services Group, including Michael's principal Trust contact, Bywater, all of whom office
adjacent to the Trust Department, will be witnesses in any litigation to enforce the loan.
It is inconceivable that, given this state of affairs, the Bank can remain impartial,
disinterested and loyal to the interests of the ultimate beneficiary. The diversification program,
by which the Bank seeks to convert stable but potentially appreciating AT&T stock into bonds,
obviously benefits the Bank not only from the standpoint of administrative fees but also as a
means of reducing any risk to the source of recovery on the loan. The Bank may also be tempted
to place Trust assets in investments that will generate short-term income against which it may
levy to collect the loan. This conflict destroys any justification for keeping the Bank as trustee.
D.

The Disingenuous Manner In Which The Bank Has Charged The Trust With
Its Attorney's Fees In This Action Provides Further Evidence Of The Bank's
Compromised Position.

The final blow to the Bank's trustee status results from its precipitous assessment of
attorney's fees against the Trust. In a July 7, 1999 letter, Don Showalter of the Bank's Trust
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Department attempts to explain why he has charged the Trust $3,046.35 in attorney's fees in the
June, 1999, statement (Second Affidavit, Exhibit R). He represents as follows:
[T]he bank in its capacity as trustee hired the firm Callister Nebeker &
McCullough to represent it in relation to vour efforts to "break" the trust. While
the bank continues to be a neutral party to this action, it was determined that, as
trustee, the bank should be aware of the various petitions filed by both parties.
This firm also was asked to file our objection to your petition to remove the bank
as trustee. Our only reason for doing so is that we feel we have been acting in a
prudent manner pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement by which we are
bound.
(Emphasis added). In so charging the Trust assets, of which Michael is the sole ultimate
beneficiary, with the fees of counsel, the Bank abandons neutrality and imposes on Michael an
additional expense for challenging Piersol.
Likewise, the Bank penalizes Michael for questioning the propriety of the Bank's
continuing as trustee. See Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat 7 Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 901
(1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the conduct of parties during the course of litigation itself can
demonstrate hostility sufficient to warrant removal of a trustee). Taken together with the Bank's
other actions detailed above, in the prior Memorandum in Support of Michael Kearn's Motion
for Summary Judgment, and m Michael's two affidavit, the time is long past that Wells Fargo
can claim complete loyalty to anyone but itself.
CONCLUSION
Viewed in the aggregate, the undisputed facts of the Bank's relationship with Michael
compel the conclusion that, as a matter of law, this Court should appoint a new trustee not
burdened with the conflicts of interest and historical missteps that poison the beneficiary/trustee
relationship in this instance
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Dated this>#V^ day of August, 1999.
KERTON & McCONKIE

:ric C. Olson
Matthew K. Richards
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO WELLS FARGO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
mailed, postage fully prepaid, this 26th day of August, 1999, to the following:
George E. Harris, Jr.
Jennifer Ward
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Andrew H. Stone
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170 South Main Street, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

M^^-^JUi.

cTL Qcz^jQ

W 3000\8306' 0002\mJCTMemSuppMotSJ_dangeTrustee_:Pldwpd

r cnTlFY
THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF
H THAT
A

SrL0 0 CUMENTO^^NT^TH

OFI
STRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. * * *
OF UTAH.
DATE
f^PUTY COURT CLERK

14

ADDENDUM #2

FILED
EncC. Olson (#4108)
Matthew K. Richards (#7972)
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Attorneys for Petitioner
Michael J. Kearns
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION

In the Matter of
THE THOMAS F. KEARNS, JR. and
MARY DURKIN KEARNS TRUST,

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL J. KEARNS
Case No. 993900489 TR
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Michael J. Kearns, being first duly sworn, does depose and state as follows:
1. This Affidavit supplements my earlier affidavit in this action and is a response to the
affidavits filed by Wells Fargo. I make the following statements based on my personal
knowledge.
2. My employment background is in the media business. For more than twenty years, I
have been a publishing executive including stints with two Fortune 500 companies. During that
time, I have developed contacts in the communications industry and have closely followed the
growth of that industry and its investment potential. In the process, I have developed
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considerable knowledge and expertise in understanding that industry from both an operational
and investment standpoint.
Partial Termination of the Trust
3. Originally, I was one of six ultimate beneficiaries of the subject Trust, the other five
being my siblings. (As noted in my earlier affidavit, the Trust does provide for a nominal yearly
annuity to be paid to my mother Mary Piersol ("Piersol") during her lifetime in the amount of
S416.66.) In the mid-1990's, Piersol and my five siblings negotiated a partial termination of the
Trust by agreeing that they would split in six equal parts the five-sixths of the Trust to which the
siblings had a claim upon PiersoFs death.
4. I dissented from this termination in the belief that the block of Kearns Tnoune
Corporation stock that was the sole Trust asset was more valuable as a block at that point in time
than if it were divided up among the beneficiaries. As a consequence, the 1997 court order
partially terminating the Trust left my one-sixth share intact. * Tarn now the sole beneficiary of
the corpus of the Trust subject only to my mother's nominal annual stipend.
5. I have had a keen interest in the handling of the Trust assets for two reasons: first, the
sizeable block of stock of Kearns Tribune Corporation had great historical and sentimental value
because my great-grandfather, former U.S. Senator Thomas Kearns, had founded that business
and, second, I believed based on my knowledge of the communications industry that this block
of stock had considerable intrinsic value in the emerging consolidation of media outlets.
6. M\ siblings and Piersol obtained direct control of the siblings' portions of the Trust at
a time when the total value of the entire Trust stood at about So.3 million. Shortly after the
partial termination of the Trust in 1997, consistent with my expectations of the market, Tele-
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Communications Inc. ("TCI") purchased Kearns Tribune and the Trust's asset became publicly
trading stock of much greater value than the previous block of stock.
7. With the remaining Trust assets now constituting my one-sixth portion of the original
assets being held primarily for my benefit, I became concerned to ascertain the knowledge and
abilities of those charged with the management of those assets as trustee and to have a voice in
that management.
The Trustee and Its Employees
8. Originally, Walker Bank was named as the institutional trustee. Walker Bank had
long-standing connections with the Kearns family through John Fitzpatrick, long-time publisher
of The Salt Lake Tribune and secretary of Kearns Tribune Corporation, whose brother Joseph
Fitzpatrick was head of the Walker Bank Trust Department.
9. Various corporate acquisitions and mergers had transformed the original Walker Bank
first into First Interstate Bank, then Wells Fargo Bank and finally Norwest Bank doing business
as Wells Fargo Bank (hereinafter "Wells Fargo" or "the Bank")- None of those presently dealing
with the Trust assets has more than three years experience with the Trust.
10. In 1997, shortly before the time that the court partially terminated the Trust, I moved
back to Utah with my wife. At the time, I contacted Wells Fargo directly to discuss the Trust.
As already noted, I was particularly concerned to ascertain the experience and ability of those
who would direct the Trust now that (a) I was the primary beneficiary of what remained in the
Trust and (b) the Trust asset had become a block of publicly trading TCI stock rather than closely
held Kearns Tribune stock.
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11. My principal contact at Wells Fargo on Trust issues has been Larry Bywater
("Bywater"), vice-president and regional manager. Bywater offices at the north end of the
second floor of the Wells Fargo Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, adjacent to the offices of Don
Showalter ("Showalter"), John Tingey ("Tingey"), Rees Peterson ("Peterson") and Brad Wiggins
("Wiggins"), all of whom are his subordinates in the Private Banking Department of Wells Fargo
with whom I have dealt.
12. Showalter is a vice-president and trust officer with immediate responsibility for the
Trust. Tingey is a vice president over investment management and supervises Petersen, an
assistant vice-president of investment management who has day-to-day responsibility over Trust
investments. Petersen has been with Wells Fargo only three years and, as I have observed him,
appears to lack significant experience in investments generally or the communications market in
particular.
13. Wiggins holds the same position as Petersen. As*I have detailed below, I dealt with
Wiggms at Bywater's direction in connection with the unsecured 5250,000 loan mentioned at
paragraph 10 of my original affidavit.
Trust Management—Deficiencies and Conflicts
14. My earliest concern about Wells Fargo relevant to the present action arose when I
first contacted Tingey and Petersen in October, 1997 regarding the Trust. They then informed
me of a plan to diversify the Trust assets in the wake of the TCI acquisition of Keams Tribune
stock and, at my request, showed me a two-page copy of their plan. Thereafter, I wrote to
Tmgey to discuss my current needs and to request that Wells Fargo not diversify the Trust assets
at that time. I further noted that Wells Far^o's role had changed from one of mere custodian of
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the Kearns Tribune stock to one of asset manager. A copy of this October 8, 1997 letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
15. My reasoning for opposing diversification was the expectation of the market that TCI
stock would appreciate and perhaps be the subject of acquisition by a larger entity.
16. I was sufficiently concerned about the stated intentions of Tingey and Petersen that I
called Bywater directly in Arizona (before he had formally assumed his position in Salt Lake
City with Wells Fargo following the First Interstate merger) to voice my opposition to the
diversification proposed.
17. My attorney Jerry Mooney also sent a December 24, 1997 letter to Showalter
confirming my opposition to diversification. A copy of this letter is Exhibit B to this affidavit.
The Bank did not pursue diversification at that time.
18. My concern with Wells Fargo increased when I discovered that Tingey and Petersen
were unaware of a true diversification opportunity to convert tax free 30% of the TCI stock into
shares of TCI Venture Class A stock. I brought this opportunity to their attention and strongly
urged them to pursue this conversion, which they did to the great advantage of the Trust. (The
original TCIVA shares acquired in March, 1998 with an initial value of 51,096,521.75 are now
shares of AT&T Corp. Liberty Media Group Class A with a value of $2,377,799. See Asset and
Transaction Statements dated October 31, 199^ at 5 and March 31, 1998 at 3 and Account
Summary dated June 30, 1999 at 5 attached as Exhibits C, D and E respectively.)
19. A second problem with Wells Fargo arose in October, 1997, when the Bank sold 700
shares of TCI stock to pay itself fees for which all of the Kearns siblings were liable, not just me
or my portion of the Trust assets. This sale is shown on page 5 of the October 31, 1997
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Transaction Statement. I contacted Bywater regarding the error of charging my portion of the
Trust assets with the fees incurred jointly by all present and former beneficiaries. Although it
initially denied the problem, upon my further investigation and presentation of the facts, Wells
Fargo eventually acknowledged its error and replaced the 700 shares of TCI stock as reflected in
the March 31, 1998 statement at page 5.
20. As noted in my previous affidavit, the TCI stock eventually became AT&T stock
when AT&T purchased TCI. I had heard rumors of this acquisition and conveyed them to Wells
Fargo, which had no knowledge of the acquisition. This acquisition led to an even greater
enhancement of the value of the Trust. All of this was consistent with my directions to the Trust
and my purposes in resisting termination of the Trust in 1997. The effect on the value of the
Trust from these decisions is reflected in the summary history attached as Exhibit F hereto. This
shows an increase in value of the Trust asset since the partial termination of the Trust from
Sl,053,233 to 57,692,733.
21. Meanwhile, with the enhancement of the value of my portion of the original Trust
assets still held intact. I finally undertook to terminate the Trust. My mother refused to agree
unless I would give her, not just the same dollar amount that she had received from my siblings
in 1997, but the same percentage share of the Trust assets that by now had appreciated by
multiples since the partial termination of the Trust.
22. I declined her offer and sought judicial approval of the termination without her
consent. Judge Wilkinson finally concluded that, notwithstanding her nominal interest in the
Trust, my mother as one of the settlors had veto power over any termination of the Trust.
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23. During the course of the litigation with my mother, Wells Fargo held off in its threats
to diversify the Trust assets. However, no sooner had Judge Wilkinson ruled than Wells Fargo
began to proceed with diversification. I urged them to hold the block of stock of AT&T, a blue
chip company, intact while I attempted to negotiate some resolution with my mother. At the
time, AT&T was contemplating a 3:2 split of its stock. My February 5, 1999 letter requesting
further delay in diversification is Exhibit G to this affidavit.
24. I visited Peterson about ten days before the stock split. He casually mentioned to me
that, as part of the Bank's initial diversification effort and contrary to my wishes, he had sold
8,000 shares of AT&T stock at S79 per share. I was astounded that he would sell the stock while
I was in the midst of negotiations with Piersol, with the stock split impending and with further
news of certain regulatory matters favorable to AT&T emerging. Thereafter, I noted that, had he
waited just two days, the price would have risen to S85/share.
25. I immediately complained to Bywater, who responded: fcl don't understand why the>
did not wait." He promised to "cancel the buy" and later called me at home to confirm that he
had stopped the transaction. This was a great relief to me as the transaction would result in a
S50,000 loss to the Trust not counting capital gains taxes. Notwithstanding his earlier
assurances, a short time later Bywater called again to apologize but said that "it was too late" so
the trustee would exercise its "right" to do as it chose with the Trust assets. I expressed my
concern and frustrations in a letter to Bywater dated March 7, 1999, that is attached as Exhibit H
hereto.
26. .Another area of concern over Wells Fargo's management of the Trust arose when I
requested a cop> of the Bank's plan for diversification of the Trust assets. I was given a two

7

page "computer model" for "blue chip stocks." Out of curiosity, I asked acquaintances at a
competing bank trust department and a reputable asset manager each to provide such a plan and
received a sixty-page booklet outlining a host of options suitable to my particular needs as
primary and ultimate beneficiary.
27. Another area of concern arose recently when the Bank calculated the amount due to
me as a quarterly dividend from Trust assets. I sent a letter to Showalter dated April 29, 1999
noting that the amount proposed by the Bank well exceeded the amount I calculated as due and
asking the Bank to check its numbers. By letter dated April 30, 1999, the Bank advised me that
my concerns were well founded and corrected the amount owing. My April 29, 1999 letter to the
Bank and the Bank's April 30, 1999 letter to me are Exhibits I and J hereto.
28. A final concern is Wells Fargo's failure to respond to my requests for information
regarding the Trust. I specifically requested information about (1) fees incurred by the trustee for
managing the Trust, (2) Trust-related communications between4 the Wells Fargo and the law firm
Callister Nebeker & McCullough, and (3) real estate owned by the Trust that apparently derives a
yearly revenue from mining or mineral rights. Wells Fargo promised me it would supply the
requested information; yet, months later I have still not received it.
Perceived Conflicts of Interest
29 In the course of the litigation with Piersol over termination of the Trust, I sought
information regarding the relationship between Jones, Waldo, Hoibrook & McDonough, counsel
for Mary Piersol, and the Wells Fargo Trust Department. My initial August 31, 1993 letter to
By\vater requesting this information is Exhibit K hereto.

S

30. This letter was followed by two letters from my litigation counsel all seeking to find
out what PiersoFs counsel Jones Waldo already knew that being the extent of Jones Waldo's
representation of the Trust Department. These two letters (dated September 14, 1998 and
October 2, 1998 respectively) are attached as Exhibits L and N hereto.
31. Bywater's response to counsel's initial inquiries was evasive and not informative.
(This response is attached as Exhibit M hereto.) It was clear that, despite its role as trustee,
Wells Fargo refused to provide specifics to me as a beneficiary of the Trust Department's
relationship with Jones Waldo in order to resolve my concerns about the trustees' loyalty.
(Significantly, when Wells Fargo decided to oppose the present petition to change the trustee, it
took the unusual step of retaining long-time Zions Bank general counsel Callister Nebeker &
McCullough rather than its own outside counsel Jones Waldo.)
32. The later refusal by the Bank to sign an affidavit acknowledging my role in guiding
the Trust after it had signed an opposing affidavit for Piersol demonstrated that the Bank was
partisan rather than neutral.
„, .

fc

32. In opposing my petition to terminate the Trust, Piersol's counsel obtained an

affidavit from Wells Fargo to support her characterization of the relationship of Wells Fargo to
the Trust beneficiaries. I was unaware of these dealings between the Trust and Piersol until the
affidavit was served in the litigation. Then, Wells Fargo refused to sign an affidavit prepared by
my counsel reflecting the documented fact outlined above that, indeed, I had guided and
influenced the Trust management's investment decisions since the partial termination.
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The Loan
34 My October 8, 1997 letter to Tingey (Exhibit A hereto) referenced my need for
financing m the amount of 5150,000- 5250,000 for a business venture—the publication of The
Salt Lake Observer I discussed this topic with Bywater who introduced me to Wiggins, also of
the Pnvate Banking group, as one who could assist me Wiggins, in turn, made the arrangements
for the loan
35 Wiggins and Bywater made it clear that, although the loan would be unsecured,
because of my interest in the Trust the Bank would work with me and they would make the loan
happen Indeed, Wiggins and Bywater agreed that I would not be obligated to repay the pnncipal
of the loan until the Trust was terminated and I obtained access to my portion of the Trust assets
Moreover, I was able to borrow the sum of 5250,000 from Wells Fargo dealing directly with
Bywater and Wiggins and no one else Both Bywater and Wiggins signed the cashier's check
delivered to me for the amount of the loan (A copy of the check is attached as Exlubit O )
36 When the Observer venture went sour. Bywater and Wiggins took me to lunch to
inquire about how the loan would be paid I left the meeting with the understanding that they
would work with me as a valued trust customer so that the Bank would not come after me for
repayment of the loan Onlv after I concluded to seek appointment of a new trustee on Apnl 8,
1999, did collection efforts begin
3"" On Via) 4, 19()9, the Bank ga\e notice of acceleration ot the credit line and
demanded pavment [See Exhibit H to Julv 2, 1999 Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment ) On July 7, 19^9,1 was sent a letter bv certified mail from counsel for the
Bank (Richer, Swan & Overholt, not Jones Waldo) threatening litigation
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\ copv of this letter is

attached hereto as Exhibit P. On August 23, 1999,1 was served with a summons and complaint,
dated August 9, 1999 and attached hereto as Exhibit Q, whereby the Bank initiated litigation
against me seeking payment of the entire loan amount, interest, and litigation costs.
Attorney's Fees
38. As a final adversarial blow, Wells Fargo has charged the Trust with the fees incurred
when it elected to oppose my petition to appoint a new trustee. In correspondence to me dated
July 7, 1999, Showalter falsely claimed that my petition has forced the Bank to hire its present
counsel ktin relation to [my] efforts to 'break' the trust" and that it was a "neutral party to this
action." A copy of this letter is Exhibit R to this affidavit.
39. I believe that the Bank's most recent actions of diversifying the Trust assets, seeking
collection of the loan and charging the attorney's fees to the Trust on false premises axe in direct
retaliation for my effort to obtain appointment of a new trustee.

li^jQ
DATED this^
'Oday of August, 1999.

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^£* dav of August. 1999.

• -^J^U^i
Notary/Public
PUD lie y
/?
sn
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Mv/6ommission Expires.
.V SOW aJOtf&O: MKR-Mic^JelKeansAtfidav til *pd
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f*/

iTi'lSl

I \ * l f l £ v * ® /Si
^fe3f^4(^Ay
I VVN—-^Af

NccaryPjo.c
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GRETSL G.THALLER

|

60 =di>t South Temoie 3 1600
SjltLaxeCt'y J f a n 8 4 i u
My Commission expires

j
-

August 11, 2001

|
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL J. KEARNS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, this 26th day of August, 1999, to the
following:
George E. Harris, Jr.
Jennifer Ward
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Andrew H. Stone
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

TxSo-^w^-gd£q^

<^Z Y c ^

W \80O0\8306^0OO2\MKRMichaelKeamsAffidavit#2 wpd

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THI
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. STA
OF UTAH.

DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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ADDENDUM #3

FILM DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

'MAGED

SEP 23 1999

onarmxA
1

Mark S. Swan, =#3873
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 561-4750

\

Deputy Clerk

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
Or JUpGIV.c^Vo
DATE

Attomevs for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 990908206
v.

MICHAEL J. KEARNS.

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant.

Defendant. Michael J. Kearns has failed to plead or otherwise defend in this action and
default has been entered.
It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff be awarded Judgment against Defendant Michael J. Kearns
as follows:
1.

On Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint in the amount of:

S266.35l.S5

Principal

as of July 7, 1999, plus interest accruing thereafter in the amount of S59.93150 per day, plus interest
at rate of S.75°o per annum on attorney's fees and court costs awarded to Plaintiff.

99_34976 CEC wpd

P P P ? '}

1

On Count One of Plaintiff s Complaint, attorney's fees and costs of Court as follows:

SI 07.00
S837.00
S944.00

Accrued Costs to Date of Judgment
Attorney's Fees
TOTAL

For a total Judgment of:
5266,351.85
S 5,094.18
S
944.00

Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint
Interest from July 7, 1999 through September 30, 1999
Attorney's Fees and Costs

S272390.03

TOTAL

with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of S59.93150 per day, together with interest rate of 8.75%
per annum on attorney's fees and costs awarded to Plaintiff.
3.

Any Judgment ordered herein may be augmented by the amount of reasonable costs

and attorney's fees expended in collecting or enforcing the judgment by execution or otherwise as
shall be established by affidavit from Plaintiffs counsel without further notice to Defendant.
DATED this 23

day of September, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

99_34976 CEC wpd

ADDENDUM #4

MARK A. LARSEN (3727)
JEROME H. MOONEY III (2303)
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6500
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL J. KEARNS
Plaintiff,
V.

MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 990908206

:

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Mr. Kearns") submits the following Affidavit of
Michael J. Kearns in Support of His Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment:
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Michael J. Kearns, being first duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit.

2.

My son was born on August 11,1999. He suffered from severe allergies and

complications with his digestive system. His condition consumed my thoughts and caused
a tremendous amount of stress and anxiety on my family.
3.

My wife, Miriam C. Kearns ("Mrs. Kearns"), was served with the Complaint

in the present case on August 23, 1999. Due to my wife's preoccupation with sustaining
my son's life, she neglected to bring the Complaint to my attention for several days.
4.

Once Mrs. Kearns alerted me to the Complaint, I failed to file an answer or

bring it to my attorney's attention due to my own preoccupation with my son's condition.
5.

At the time I received this Complaint, I was engaged in efforts to terminate

the Kearns Trust at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). I was the primary beneficiary
of this trust, worth approximately $8 million dollars, and assumed that this Complaint was
Wells Fargo's attempt to retaliate for my efforts to terminate the trust.
6.

Sometime after the Default Judgment was entered against me, and once my

son's condition had improved, I sought the assistance of an attorney because I believed
I had counterclaims against Wells Fargo arising from its methods of dispute resolution in
this particular situation.

Subscnbed to and sworn to before me on this 27th day of December, 1999.
JB41FERLJONS
Notary Pubfic
State of Utah
My Comm. Expres May 27,2003
3M&oaO*ay # 1C0SLCLTT841O1
^

W

^

y

^

^

W

^

f

U

V

^

'"f P •»!

'^w, -\'.\;^

Klotary Public
~)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Larsen &
Mooney Law, and that in said capacity caused a true and correct copy of the preceding
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL J. KEARNS to be served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following on December 27, 1999:
Mark S. Swan
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
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MARK A. LARSEN(3727)
JEROME H. MOONEY III (2303)
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-6500
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA.

:
AFFIDAVIT OF MIRIAM C. KEARNS

Plaintiff,
V.

MICHAEL J. KEARNS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 990908206
Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Mr. Kearns") submits the following Affidavit of Miriam
C Kearns in Support of His Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment:
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Miriam C. Kearns, being first duly sworn, states as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit.

2.

On August 23,1999,1 was served with a Complaint naming my husband, Mr.

Kearns as the defendant.
3.

At the time I was served with the Complaint against my husband, I had

recently given birth to our son who suffered from severe allergies as well as complications
with his digestive system. His condition caused tremendous stress on both myself and my
husband.
4.

I was preoccupied with sustaining my son's life and neglected to immediately

give the Complaint to my husband.
5.

I did not read the Complaint and assumed that the basis for the dispute

stemmed from outstanding parking tickets.
Dated: December 27, 1999.
^

^

^

Miriam C. Kearns
Subscribed to and sworn to before me on this 27th day of December, 1999.
A

r

Sloieofutah

I

A^rCtrnr7t&pteMay27i>axaf

Notary Public
^

J

30W.apcxMcy#10DSUCire»TOl

*9*m^rm

ii w m m m mr^F^gp
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Larsen &
Mooney Law, and that in said capacity caused a true and correct copy of the preceding
AFFIDAVIT OF MIRIAM C. KEARNS to be served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following on December 27, 1999:
Mark S. Swan
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047
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May 10, 1993
Mr. Abe Gillies
GILLIES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH, ARCHITECTS
Walker Center, Suite 900
175 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION
Salt Lake City, Utah
Project No. 9211.00/FiIe 4.6 & B-2.6

SUBJECT:

CONSULTANT SERVICES AGREEMENT
Consultant Architect

Dear Abe:
This letter supercedes our previous Consultant Services Agreement letters dated October 6, 1992 and
February 10, 1993 and proposes to establish in writing, a final agreement between our two firms for the
provision of professional services in connection with the design and construction of the Salt Lake Convention
Center Renovation and Expansion, Salt Lake City, Utah (PROJECT).
As you are aware, our Prime Agreement with Salt Lake County (COUNTY) has been amended subsequent
to our original Consultant Services Agreement letter. We now wish to establish the final terms and
condftions of our relationship with your firm based on this amendment and our current understanding of the
scope and implementation strategy desired by the County.

A.

AGREEMENT

1. The following terms and conditions shall apply to this Agreement between Thompson,
Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc., a Georgia corporation and Robert Norman Veale,
an individual (ARCHITECT), and Gillies Stransky Brems Smith, Architects (CONSULTANT):

B.

PRIME AGREEMENT

1. The Architect has entered into an Agreement dated May 20, 1992 (PRIME AGREEMENT)
with the County, including Amendment No. 1 dated December 21, 1992, attached as
Exhibit "A" and is hereby made a part of this Agreement, which provides for certain
professional services to be furnished by the Architect in connection with the Salt Palace
Renovation & Expansion project as described therein.
2. The term •Architect" when used in this Agreement shall have the same meaning as the
term "Consultant" when used in the Prime Agreement, each term referring to Thompson,
• Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc., a Georgia corporation and Robert Norman Veale,
an indiv: 'ual.
3. The Consultant agrees to provide complete professional services for their designated
portion of the Project in the same manner and to the same extent that the Architect is
bound by the Prime Agreement, (as amended from time to time, with copies to the
Consultant) attached as Exhibit "A", and shaJI render all other collateral services for their
designated portion of the Project such as are customary in the industry as may be
conducive to economy and sound development of the Project
4. h is agreed in the event the Prime Agreement and this Agreement are found to be in
conflict, that this Agreement shall govern as it relates to the assigned tasks and its related
compensation between the Architect and the Consultant and the Prime Agreement shaH
govern as it relates to the professional services to be provided to the County.

THOMPSON, VENTULETT, STAINBACK & ASSOCIATES, INC.
ROBERT NORMAN VEALE, ARCHITECT
2700 PROMENADE TWO • 1230 PEACHTREE STREET N.L • ATIANTA. CEORC1A

30309-3591

• 404/M«-6600 • FAX 404/BM-&7nn

PLANNING
ARCHITECTURE
INTERIOR DESIGN

May 10, 1993
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1. The Architect and the Consultant understand and fully agree that each individual firm shall
be fully responsible for obtaining and maintaining Its Corporate and Professional
Registration in the State of Utah and other legal and professional requirements, in
accordance with all regulatory statutjs having Jurisdiction.
2. rt is agreed that this Agreement Is limited by the professional services for the Project as
set forth in the Prime Agreement (as amended from time to time, with copies to the
Consultant), attached as Exhibit "A", and shall end when performance of the Prime
Agreement for the work of the Project has been fully completed; all monies received from
the County have been distributed; and further all liabilities and expenses incurred on
behalf of the Project, including Call Back and any and all claims by the County and
others, have been fully discharged.
3. All Drawings and Specifications prepared by the Consultant in connection with the
development and the construction of the Project shall bear the signature and seal of the
Consultant.
No drawing or specifications shall be Issued for construction by the Consultant until they
have been released for construction by the Architect.
4. The Consultant shall be fully responsible for preparing Its portion of the Architect's Work
to comply with applicable codes and other governmental requirements using its highest
degree of care, learning, skill and ability. Further, the Consultant shall be responsible to
analyze Schematic, Design,Development, and/or other information provided by the
Architect and to make technical design refinements and documentation of all elements
for its portion of the Work. The Consultant agrees to prepare Drawings, Specifications
and other documents for its portion of the Architect's Work In which W designates
completely, definitely and clearly the methods and materials of construction, and shall
be fully responsible for the adequacy, completeness and accuracy of the work product
provided by the Consultant.
5. The Architect and Consultant hereby designate an individual upon whom the other firm
can rely for decisions on behalf of each firm, who shall be referred to as the Project
Representative. The Project Representatives shall be:
Architect:
Consultant:

H. Preston Crum
Abe Gillies

6. By the execution of this Agreement, each firm contracts to the other that it is possessed
of that degree of care, learning, skill, and ability which is ordinarily possessed by other
members of its profession and further contracts that the performance of the duties herein
set forth it will exercise such degree of care, learning, skill and ability as it is ordinarily
employed by other professionals under similar conditions and like circumstances and
shall perform such duties without neglect, and shall not be liable except for failure to
perform such degree of care, learning, skill and ability.
7. The Consultant shall for its designated portion of the Project be responsible to the
Architect and shall perform "Consultant's Designated Services" in the same manner and
to the same extent that the Architect is bound by the Prime Agreement and In the same
manner and to the same extent that the Architect Is responsible to ihs County.
8. Budgetary limitations shall not be a justification for breach of sound principles of Design,
and further, In the event the Consultant cannot design its portion of the Project within the
estimated construction contract amount, as established by the County, without
disregarding sound principles of design, immediate written notice shall be made to the
Architect

May 10, 1993
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Mr. Abe Gillies
Project No. 9211.00/Fiie 4.6 & B-2.6

D. PROJECT PUBLICITY

1. The Architect and Consultant will make every effort to secure proper recognition for all
design disciplines in all Project publicity. On all publicity, the Architect will be Identified
as the Architect and the Consultant will be Identified as the Consultant Architect, and to
the maximum extent practical, engineers and other consultants will £e listed immediately
under or beside the Consultant Architect.
2. While neither of the parties to this Agreement anticipate that a media release would omit
the mention of either of the firms, It is recognized that this can happen through no fault
of either firm, h Is hereby agreed that In the event only one of the parties to this
Agreement is mentioned in a media release, the firm that is mentioned in the media shall
attempt to have the release immediately corrected and, In addition, shall provide a written
explanation to the omitted firm listing corrective measures, all within thirty (30) calendar
days.

E.

BID/CONSTRUCTION
PACKAGES

1. ft is agreed that the Bid/Construction Documents will be subdivided into two separate
packages, to be competitively bid separately and constructed sequentially by separate
contractors. The "Demolition" Bid/Construction Package will include the demolition and
removal of the existing Accord Arena and Convention Hall on the West Temple side of the
project. The "Convention Center" Bid/Construction Package will include the new general
construction of the Exhibit Hall spaces, Meeting/Banquet Spaces and associated work
primarily on the West Temple side of the project
2. ft is anticipated that the County will authorize a third package. The "South Temple"
Bid/Construction Package will include the new Meeting Room Spaces which will be
added and which will span over Second West together with adjacent support/service
areas.

P-

CONSULT NTS
DESIGNA' ~D SERVICES

1. While the consultant has certain obligations for all phases of the Project as further
described herein, the major work assignments of the Consultant are described as follows:
-

PROGRAMMING AND URBAN DESIGN PHASES
Minor responsibility limited to "public relations" appearances, attendance at Architect's
presentations related to the Project that occur in Salt Lake City, gather support data
as may be required by this phase of work (such as photographic materials, utility
information and existing conditions information).

-

SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE
Minor responsibility limited to attendance at project meetings in Salt Lake City
(primarily with but not limited to Consultant and County Meetings) for the purpose
of assisting the Architect to manage and coordinate with other consultants; gather
support data as may be required for this phase of work (such as existing conditions
and preparation of measured drawings of special existing conditions requiring detail
Information).

-

DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Minor responsibility similar to that described for the Schematic Design Phase with an
increased responsibility for management and coordination with other Consultants to
the Architect in Salt Lake City.

-

CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENT PHASE
Minor responsibility similar to that described for the Schematic Design Phase with
additional responsibility to assist the Architect with the coordination of the work of the
consultants in Salt Lake City.
Major responsibility in submitting documents for approval by appropriate
governmental agencies In conjunction with the regulatory agencies having jurisdiction
for this project as well as responsibility for the preparation of the "Front End" Bid
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Documents (Genera] Conditions, Instructions to Bidders, Construction Contract and
Division One "General Requirements" of the Project Specffications).
Major responsibility, based on the Oamer approved Design Development Documents
(including the cost estimate) for the preparation of Construction Documents related
to the Demolition Bid/Construction Package, the Temporary Measures'Bid/Constructlon Package and designated areas/components of the Project including: renovations
to the existing South Temple portion of the Project (such as adding Meeting Rooms
in the north lobby and modifying the interior finishes of the existing Meeting
Rooms/public circulation areas); renovations to the Arts Center front entrance on
West Temple and renovations to the southwest storage/maintenance areas scheduled
to remain. (See Exhibit "E" for graphic description of scope.)
The County has authorized a separate Temporary Measures Bid/Construction
Package to accelerate certain components of construction ahead cf demolition
activities. The extra services required by the Consultant will be considered Additional
Services and compensation will be In accordance with paragraph G-3.
-

BID PHASE
Major responsibilities to include the coordination, "day-to-day" processing/management
and professional consultant services of Bid/Negotiation activities from the Consultant's
office in Salt Lake City. Overview project management and review will be provided by the
Architect during this phase.

-

CONSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATION PHASE
Major responsibilities to include the administration of the construction contracts
including the coordination/day-to-day" management, and processing of Construction
Administration activities from the Consultant's office in Salt Lake City. Overview
project management and review will be provided by the Architect during this phase.

-

AS-BUILT PHASE
Major responsibility for coordinating and gathering necessary "As-Built" information
from the Contractor and the preparation of the set of "As-Built" Documents.

2. Basic Service Consultant Architect responsibilities are identified in the following
Tabulation of Professional Services.
TABULATION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
SYMBOLS:

V
"o"
•-•

Major Responsibility
Minor Responsibility
No Responsibility
TEMPORARY MEASURES

Outline Description of Services per Phase
- URBAN DESIGN AND PROGRAMMING
Business Administration
Overview Project Management
County Review and Approvals
I Programming
Urban Design
Cost Estimating
Presentations in Salt Lake
I Data Gathering

CONSTRUCTION

DEMOLITION
CONSTRUCTION

Responsibility

Responsibility

TVS&A

GSBS

TVS&A

CONV. CENTER
CONSTRUCTION
i

Responsibility

GSBS

TVS&A

GSBS

X

X

—
—
—
-

X

0

0

X

X

Not
Applicable

!

Not
Applicable

|
'I

X

I

x

|

x
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TEMPORARY MEASURES

Outline Description of Services per Phase

CONSTRUCTION

DEMOLITION
CONSTRUCTION

Responsibility

Responsibility

\ TVS&A

I - SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE
Business Administration
Overview Project Management
Phase Approval by County
Manage and Coordinate Consultants
Building Code Information
Coordination with Regulatory Agencies
Schematic design studies and solutions
Sketches and Study Model
Schematic Design Drawings and Specifications
Coordination of Engineering Systems
Cost Estimates
Presentations in Salt Lake
Data Gathering
-

I
-

Responsibility

GSBS

j TVS&A [ GSBS

X

—
—

X

0

X

0

X

SAME

SAME

0

X

0

X

— I

X

—
—
—
—

X

0

0

X

X

—
—

X
X

X

|

SAME

SAME

I!
i

X

~

X

O

0

0
0

X

—

X

—

X

—
—
—

X
X

0

X

—

X

0

0

X

-

X

|

X

—

X

__

I'

X

0

X

0

X

0

x

X

0

0

X

0

X

X

0

0

X

o

X

0

X

0

x

0

X

0

X

0

X

X

0
0

X
0

j

X
X

X

j

|'

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

X

0

X

0

X

0
X

0

X

0

X

0

-

X

-

X

-

0

X

0

x

I

'

X

X

DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Business Administration
Overview Project Management
Phase Approval by County
Manage and Coordinate Consultants
Formulation of Major Systems by Consultants
(Structural, Mechanical and Electncal Systems)
Selection of Major Building Materials
Preparation of Documents
Drawings
Specifications
Perspective sketches or study models
Reviewing plans with Regulatory Agencies
Cost Estimate
Presentations in Salt Lake
Data Gathering
Measured Drawings of Special Existing Conditions
CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENT PHASE
Business Administration
Overview Project Management
Phase Approval by County
Manage and Coordinate Consultants
Preparation of Documents
Front End
(Owner/Contractor Contract, General & Special
Conditions, Bid Documents, etc)
Specifications
Drawings
Cost Estimate
Apply for Approvals of Governmental Agencies
Presentations
Data Gathering
Measured Drawings of Special Existing Conditions
Coordinate independent Testing for County

TVS&A

GSBS

CONV CENTER
j CONSTRUCTION

0

X

x

I
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j

DEMOLITION
CONSTRUCTION {

TEMPORARY MEASURES f

CONSTRUCTION

Responsibility

Responsibility

DDNV. C E N T E R )
CONSTRUCTION }
Responsibility

TVS&A j GSBS [ TVS&A 1 GSBS | TVS&AJ GSBS 1

I Outline Description of Services per Phase
i - BIDDING/NEGOTIATION PHASE
Business Administration
Overview Project Management
County Review and Approvals
Conferences with Bidders, Consultants
Advertising for Bids
Assemblage, Reproduction &. Distribution of Bid Document j
Drafting of Addenda
Contractor's Questions, Substitutions
Analyze Bid
j
Assist County with Award of Construction Contract
'

X

-

X

-

X

X

0

X

0

X

0

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

x

o

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

X

—

X

0

0

X

0

X

0

X

:

—

'

X

1

!

I - CONSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATION PHASE
Business Administration
Overview Project Management
County Approvals
Administration oi Construction Contract
Pre-Construction Conference
I
Construction Administration
Review/Approve Shop Drawings
Review/Approve Submittals
Prepare Architectural Clarification Documentation
(including Field Sketches, Architect's Supplementary
Instructions, Construction Change Directives, etc.)
Manage and Coordinate Consultants
J
Review Substitutions Requests
|
Administer Independent Testing Program
Design Jntent Interpretations including
Aesthetic Decisions and Color Selection
Process Change Orders
I
Approve Change Orders
Process Applications for Payment
Certify Applications for Payment
Maintain Logs of CA-related items
[
Periodic Site Visits & Field Reports
Process Contractor's Request for Information
I
Substantial Completion Visits & Reports
Final Completion Visits &. Reports
Post-Completion "Call Back"
- AS-BUILT DOCUMENT PHASE
Assemble As-Built Documentation from Contractor
Prepare Updated CAD Drawings
Assemble and Deliver to Owner

0

X

0

X

X

0

SAME

SAME

0
0

1

X

0

!
I

SAME

SAME
i

i

{

i

i

i

X
0

X

X

x

|

0

0

x

X

0

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

x

0

X

0

X

0

X

0

X

1

!
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1. The Consultant shall be compensated for its Basic Services portion of the work for a total
stipulated lump sum of Four Hundred Seventy-One Thousand, Fifty-Seven Dollars
($471,057.00) to be earned and invoiced in accordance with the following schedule:
1) Urban Design
2) Programming
3) Architecture & Engineering
-

Schematic Phase
Design Development Phase
Construction Document Phase
Bid Phase
Construction Administration Phase
As-Built Document

Subtotal (Architecture &. Engineering Phase)
TOTAL (Stipulated Lump Sum)

i

1,000.00
5,000.00

$

13,952.00
18,602.00
74,409.00
32,554.00
292,986.00
32,554.00

S465.057.00
$471,057.00

2. The stipulated lump sum amount for Basic Services Is based on the fixed limit of
construction cost as set forth In the Prime Agreement and subsequently amended In
Amendment No. 1.
Jf subsequent modifications to the fixed limit of construction cost are approved by the
County or the scope of work set forth in the Consultant's Designated Services is
modified, the Consultant's stipulated lump sum amount shall be appropriately modified.
3. The County has authorized a separate Temporary Measures Bid/Construction Package.
The extra services to accelerate this portion of the work as to be provided by the
Consultant will be considered Additional Services and the compensation will be $2,500
to be invoiced in accordance with Exhibit "C".
4. Additional Service Compensation when approved by the County in writing will be on a
fee basis agreed upon prior to approval and the Initiation of the work. The Architect has
no obligation to compensate Additional Services unless written authorization has been
obtained from all appropriate parties on the Additional Services Authorization Form
attached as Exhibit "D" and is hereby made a part of this Agreement.
5. The Consultant shall be compensated for Reimbursable Expenses on an "at-cost" basis
with no mark-up for those expenses incurred by the Consultant and to the extent as set
forth in the Prime Agreement (Exhibit "A', Article V.3h) and paid by the County. Original
supporting documentation for reimbursable expenses must be submitted to the Architect
with the Consultant's monthly invoice.
6. Compensation for special reimbursable expenses by and between the Architect and
Consultant which are not necessarily addressed in the Prime Agreement are clarified
below:
-

Cost of mylar sheets (30" x 45") for the preparation of Consultant's original drawings,
costs of computer plotting and other reproduction costs necessary for progress
printing between the Architect and all other consultants for coordination purposes
shall be paid by the Consultant.

-

Consultant shall be responsible for preparing and updating Consultant's background
drawings as needed. The Architect, based on the progress of his work, will furnish
either blueline prints or computer disks (containing DXF translations from CADVANCE
Software) of architectural floor plans for the Consultant's use in his preparation of
backgrounds. Consultant cannot rely solely on computer translations for all
background updates.

-

Reproduction costs to produce Consultant backgrounds from Architect's original
drawings fif required) shall be paid by the Consultant.

Mr. Abe Gillies
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7. All Invoices (Basic Services, Relmbursables, and Additional Services) shall be submitted
In the Lump Sum Format attached as Exhibit "BB and is hereby made a part of this
Agreement and shall be submitted to the Architect on or before the 1Qth day of the
month. The Architect shall endeavor to prepare each month a composite Invoice and
mall to the County within 10 working days from the 10th day of the month.
8. Lump Sum Format invoices which include Additional Services shall be accompanied by
a detailed breakdown of professional services rendered and this breakdown shall be
submitted in the Additional Services Invoice Itemization Format attached as Exhibit "C"
and is hereby made a part of this Agreement.
9. H is understood and agreed that no payment shall be due to the Consultant until such
time as the Architect receives like payment from the County for services previously
rendered and approved. Typically within 14 days from the date of the Architect receives
payment from the County, like payment of County approved amounts will be mailed to
the Consultant.
10. It is understood and agreed that the Consultant may be requested from time to time by
the County, or other parties, to provide services not described in this Agreement or in the
Prime Agreement. The Architect is under no obligation to compensate the Consultant for
any such services unless written authorization has been established as per the
procedures established in this agreement.

H.

INSURANCE

1. During the life of the Prime Agreement, the Consultant shall provide and maintain in force
the Insurance coverage and limits as set forth hereinbelow, all in accordance with the
insurance requirements of the Prime Agreement attached as Exhibit "A".
2. The required insurance shall be written by a company or companies authorized and
licensed to do business in the State of Utah.
3. The Consultant shall furnish a certificate of insurance to the Architect on a form(s)
standard in the insurance industry providing evidence of the maintenance of said
insurance and shall provide that insurance evidenced by the certificate(s) will not be
canceled or reduced except upon thirty (30) days prior written notice.
4. The minimum coverage and limits of insurance to be carried by the Consultant shall be
as follows:
Professional Liability:

$1,000,000
Maximum of $100,000

Worker's Compensation:
General Liability:
Automobile Liability:
Excess Liability:
I.

INDEMNIFICATION

Limit (Minimum)
Deductible per Occurrence

Statutory Limits
$1,000,000

Limit (Minimum)

$500,000

Limit (Minimum)

$1,000,000

Limit (Minimum)

Each party to this Agreement hereby agrees to protect, defend, indemnify and hold
harmless the other (its agents and employees) from and against any and all claims
(public and private), penalties (contractual or otherwise) and damages arising directly or
indirectly out of or resulting from any Improper performance caused, or alleged to have
been caused In whole or in part by any negligent act, error or omission, by the parties
to this Agreement (its agents and employees) professional services, for its portion of the
Architect's Work, as further defined herein, in the performance of the obligations under
the terms and conditions of the Prime Agreement attached as Exhibit "A\ This
indemnification shall include an obligation of each party for this Agreement to protect the
other who is found not at fault from any and all costs of defending allrights,dalms, or

Mr. Abe Gillies
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demands, including attorney's fees and insurance policy deductibles incurred b> the
other In litigation and settlement of same.
2. h is agreed as between the parties of this Agreement that in any and all actions against
the other (its agents and employees), this indemnification obligation shall not be limited
In any way by any limitation on the amount or type of damages, compensation and/cr
benefits payable under Workmen's Compensation Acts, or any other employee benef,:
acts.
3. It Is agreed as between the parties of this Agreement that in any and all actions, the othe*
(its agents and employees), hereby agrees to waive all subrogation rights against th?
party of this Agreement who is found not at fault.
4. Anything contained in the Prime Agreement and this Agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding, it is specifically understood that this indemnification paragraph sha i
survive the execution of this Agreement, the design and construction of the Project anc
the expiration of the Statute of Limitations for the Project

J.

SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS

1. The Architect and the Consultant respectively, bind themselves, their partners, principal:
successors, assigns and legal representatives to this Agreement with respect to a
covenants of this Agreement. Neither professional firm shall assign, sublet or transfer it:
interest in this Agreement, without the prior written consent of the other.

K.

TERMINATION

1. This Agreement shall automatically terminate, if and when, the Prime Agreemer'
attached as Exhibit "A" is terminated. The Architect shall promptly notify the Consultar
of such termination.
2. It is understood and agreed that this Agreement may be terminated by either profession:
firm with seven (7) days written notice if other firm fails to perform in accordance with tN
Terms and Conditions of the Prime Agreement or this Agreement as further describe,
herein, and further any such termination of this Agreement shall have the prior writte-approval of the County.
3. H the Architect is terminated, the Consultant for its completed portions of the Project she
be compensated according to Terms and Conditions of the Prime Agreement, contingc
upon receipt of such payment from the County.

L

EXTENT OF AGREEMENT

This Agreement represents the entire integrated Agreement between the Architect an
the Consultant and supercedes all prior negotiations, representations or agreement;
either written or oral.
2. This Agreement may be amended only by written instrument signed by both the Architei
and the Consultant.
3. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall r
deemed to be an original, but which together constitute but one and the san
Agreement.

M. FULL PERFORMANCE

The Architect and the Consultant hereby agree to the full performance of the terms aconditions contained herein and in the Prime Agreement. This Agreement is effective :*
day and year first written above, but actually executed by the Architect and Consuls
on dates Indicated beside each signature hereinbelow.

Mr. Abe Gillies
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The preceding terms and conditions together with the attached exhibits represents our proposed Agreement;
however, you wOI note that our Agreement with your firm is subject to review and written approval by the
County's Project Manager. A copy of this Agreement wOI be forwarded to Sands Brooke, the County's Project
Manager, for this purpose after it is finalized. We wDi be pleased to discuss any items which may require further
elaboration or discussion and sincerely look forward to working with you and your company on this prestigious
project in Salt Lake.
Please indicate your acceptance of this Agreement by adding your signature below ana returning the original to
us for our files.
Sincerely,
THOMPSON, VENTULETT, STAINBACK & ASSOCIATES, INC./
ROBERT NORMAN VEALE, ARCHITECT

H. Preston Crum, AlA
Partner
HPC/jd
cc:

Sands Brooke/County
Roger Neuenschwander/TVS&A
Robert Veale/TVS&A
Foster Lynn/TVS&A

Attachments:
Exhibit "A":
Exhibit "BM:
Exhibit H C:
Exhibit HD":
Exhibit "Ew:

Suspense:

Prime Agreement (dated May 20, 1992) including
Amendment No. 1 (dated December 21, 1992)
Lump Sum Format for Invoices (No Date)
Additional Services Invoices itemization Form (No Date)
Additional Service Authorization Form (No Date)
Graphic Description of Scope of Work (dated May 7, 1993)

May 21, 1993

AGREEMENT
CONSULTANT
Gillies Stransky.Brems Smitn Arcnrtecis

By:
Title:

Date:,

EXHIBIT "A"

Prime Agreement (dated May 20,1992) Including
Amendment No. 1 (dated December 21,1992)

PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER

EXHIBIT T3'

FORMAT FOR INVOICING
(Lump Sum Fee Basis)

GILUES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH, ARCHITECTS
Associated Architect Consultant Services
Consultant Invoice Number.
Consultant Invoice Date:
TVS&Associates Project Number
Project Title:

For Professional Services Rendered:
Fee Basis:

PHASE

9211.00
SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION
Salt Lake City, Utah *
Through (Date)
Stipulated Lump Sum $384,000.00

%
FEE

PART OF FEE

%
COMPI

FEE EARNED

LESS PREV.
INVOICED

AMOUNT DUE
THIS INVOICE

A. BASIC SERVICES:
1) Urban Planning

1,000.00

2) Facilities Programming

5,000.00

;3) Architecture and Engineering
a) Schematic Phase
b) Design Development
c) Construction Document
d) Bid/Negotiation
e) Construction Administration
f) As-Buiit Documents
Subtotal (Architecture & Engineeiing)
TOTAL

13,952.00
18,602.00
74,409.00
32,554.00
292,986.00
32.554.00

$

$

$

$465,057.00
$471,057.00

$

$

$

B. ADDITIONAL SERVICES:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Previously Billed & Paid
Previously Billed & Unpaid
Current Items (Itemize on Attachment)
Additional Service Total

C. REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES:
1) Previously Billed & Paid
2) Previously Billed & Unpaid
3) Current Items (Itemize on Attachment)

D. PROJECT TOTALS:

00213

EXHIBIT "C

FORMAT FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICE INVOICE
(To be used only as attachment with Lump Sum Format)

SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION
Salt Lake City, Utah
TVS&Associates Project No. 9211.00
Consultant Name

GILUES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH ARCHITECTS

Consultant invoice Number
Consultant Invoice Date
For Professional Services Rendered From:

A.

Additional Services Title

B.

Additional Sen/ices Authorization Number (Assigned by TVS&A):

C.

Fee Basis:

D.

Invoice Itemization for Labor Cost (Current):
Job Category

Name

Hours

Rate

a.

Cost
$

b.
c.
TOTAL THIS INVOICE

E.

S

Summary for this Additional Service

FEE EARNED

LESS PREV.
INVOICED

AMOUNT DUE
THIS INVOICE

Previously Billed and Paid
Previously Billed & Unpaid
Current Items (Itemized above)

Additional Service Total

00214

EXHIBfT "D"

ADDITIONAL SERVICE AUTHORIZATION FORM

TO:

Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc.
Robert Norman Veale, Architect
Attention: H. Preston Crum

DATE:
FROM:

GILUES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH ARCHITECTS

RE:

SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION
Salt Lake City, Utah
Project No. 9211.00

Additional Service Authorization No.
In accordance with the Architect/Consultant Agreement, written authorization by the Architect is hereby requested
for performance of the below listed Additional Service.
Additional Services Title:
Services to be performed by:

,

Description of Services:

FEE

Lump Sum

Guaranteed
Maximum

Estimated

Invoiced Amount

s

s

$

I

Estimated percent complete on service:

Additional Service to be billed to:

_

(Sub-Project N i iber)

Submitted by

Authorized by

Consultant

Architect

Date

Date

00215

EXHIBIT -E"

GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF SCOPE OF WORK
dated May 7, 1993

Concourse Level Floor Plan, attached
Exhibit Hall Level Roor Plan, attached
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